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Abstract: Since the 2016 US Presidential election, the topic of fake news has become extremely prevalent
on a global scale. However, the recent issue of disinformation manufactured by malevolent agents has
given rise to new potential problems that have led to harmful consequences. Such problematic
consequences have led various government institutions to responds in a variety of ways. Given the
problematic consequences of these types of actions, should governments intervene by regulating or
prohibiting fake news? To answer this question, I present Seana Shiffrin’s unique theory regarding the
value of free speech. Within this account, Shiffrin’s follows an autonomy type theory of freedom of
speech that emphasizes the central role of participants in speech and cognition. From this theory, Shiffrin
gives a clear unique account about the value of speech. In other words, Shiffrin argues that freedom of
speech should focus on thinkers themselves and protecting their freedom of thought. Notably, I believe
the benefits to this thinker-based theory rival those of other competing theories. More importantly, she
able to draw a distinction between sincere and insincere speech. With the potential dangers that fake
news poses to the free development and operations of the thinker’s mind, Shiffrin’s compelling view
leaves open the possibility that fake news is regulable because insincere speech lacks the value that other
speech encompasses.
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Section 1) Introduction
Without a doubt, free speech is a crucial element to the success of democracies. The
ability to express and speak our mind in a public setting is an important factor that draws the line
between a democratic state to an authoritarian one. Indeed, the public would not be able to live
freely in a democracy without the freedom of the press or having the ability to criticize the
government. However, online social media has played an increasingly important role in
communication as to how we obtain information and news within our public sphere. This
prevalent presence of social media raises the issue of whether or not it is ever permissible for
governments to intervene in this emerging channel of communication.
One case that has stirred this discussion further has been the recent issue of online
information manufactured by malevolent agents. The recent prevalence of online disinformation
and misinformation has given rise to new problems that have led to harmful consequences. This
effect has become a serious issue that has raised the attention of several government institutions.
To prevent the spread of what has been popularized as “fake news” government institutions have
responded by enacting legislations or public policies enforcing its regulation. In this case, the
legislation has so far focused on removing the content or punishing those responsible for posting
the information. Such actions have prompted many groups and human rights organizations to
object that these are violations of free speech or that they at least set a precedent for it. In their
view, governments should not have the power to regulate or silence voices in a public sphere like
the internet.
Given this growing conflict, ethical questions must be asked regarding the extent to
which free speech should protect online communication. Additionally, should there be
limitations to how the state regulates this channel of communication? Arguably, speech and
expression refer to the ability to express thoughts and feelings by any articulate method of
2

communication. One method for an individual to articulate their thoughts and feelings is through
social media and the internet. However, we must ask if there are types of online communication
such as disinformation that warrant regulation from the government. What are the justifications
for a state to regulate online speech activities in certain cases? To answer such questions, I will
take an approach that focuses on the morality of the situation. As such, I will not spend a lot of
time regarding the legality or practicality of the situation. Nevertheless, I will address practical
concerns regarding the government’s ability to regulate fake news.
In any case, there have been several different theoretical accounts of freedom of
expression within the literature that have attempted to explain the value of free speech. As part of
my argument, I will argue that the most compelling theory that is best suited to address complex
issues of free speech is Seana Shiffrin’s thinker-based approach to freedom of speech. Within
this account, Shiffrin follows an autonomy type theory of freedom of speech that emphasizes the
central role of participants in speech and cognition. In other words, Shiffrin argues that freedom
of speech should focus on the thinkers themselves and protect their freedom of thought. My aim
will be to highlight how Seana Shiffrin’s thinker based account is not only a worthwhile,
compelling theory of free speech, but also how it succeeds in addressing this ongoing issue of
fake news. In short, my position will be to argue that such an account is able to justify the
regulation of fake news, while still faithfully protecting the fundamental values of free speech
that many argue would be lost.
Before I begin, I will explain the layout of this paper. Firstly, I will begin by introducing
the concept of fake news. Within this section, I will present a definition of fake news that is
representative of the situation and explain how it is problematic in society. Secondly, I will
introduce Seana Shiffrin’s thinker-based account to free speech. In establishing Shiffrin’s
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theory, I explain why her theory is the most compelling account of free speech. By elaborating
on the value of free speech in this account, I will, thirdly, present Shiffrin’s argument against
lying and explain how it presents a harm to this value. Fourthly, I will apply this core idea of
lying and apply it to this contemporary case of fake news. Indeed, my position will be that
Shiffrin’s argument is able address the moral concerns regarding the conflict between fake news
and free speech. Finally, I will take the time to address the substantive and pragmatic concerns
one may have with allowing the government to regulate fake news.
Section 1(a). What is fake news?
Typically, most people would consider fake news to be false information that
masquerades as news, especially when the author is consciously aware about the false value of
the contents. However, fake news has been described in many different forms. For instance, fake
news can be described as individuals intentionally or unintentionally posting or sharing stories or
articles in their social media that are misleading. Moreover, there are articles of satire and parody
that are made deliberately to mislead people but for entertainment purposes. For this reason, a
definition of fake news will be necessary to accurately represent the moral conflict between the
government regulation of online communication and respecting free speech. Unfortunately, there
is not yet a consistent definition of the concept among the scholarly literature. The term itself
comes loaded with several different political meanings and interpretations. Nevertheless, I will
attempt to formulate a clear and representative definition to able to understand the complexity of
the moral situation.
Within the scholarly literature, the definition of fake news has varied from one schools of
thought to another. Alcott & Gentzkow (2017), leading scholars on the subject, have taken the
general and broad approach in their research and operationalization of fake news. In contrast,
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other authors have decided to take a narrower approach and divide fake news into different
relevant categories. For instance, First Draft News formulated a typology of “seven distinct
types” of false content that include: satire/parody, misleading content, imposter content,
fabricated content, false connection, false context, and manipulated content (Wardle, 2017). To
make sense of these different approaches, Tandoc et al. (2017) have argued that these definitions
involve degrees of “falsity and deception.” Examples of manipulation and fabricated content
with the intent to harm would be considered high on these axes, while news parody and
misleading content would be in the low end.
For the purposes of this paper, I will attempt to focus on categories of fake news that are
high on the level of deception, facticity, and have the intent to mislead in order to serve a
political or monetary agenda. In addition, I will limit my focus to only online communication on
the internet and social media. The reason for this limit is that social media and the internet are
emerging channels of communications in which the government has no prior precedent or history
of regulation. As such, there is an ambiguity as to how to proceed ethically. A point that I will
later address in my paper is that many of the fake news incidents originate from online sources of
communication. With these conditions, I argue that the best definition of fake news that captures
this focus comes from researcher Edda Humprecht in a communications research journal.
Accordingly, Humprecht (2018) defines fake news as, “Online publication of intentionally or
knowingly false statements of facts that are produced to serve strategic purposes and are
disseminated for social influence or profit” (p. 3). In effect, this definition best represents the
type of online disinformation that is the main source of the conflict between free speech and
government regulation of online communication.
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Understandably, some will disagree with my narrow focus on the subject and respond
that no definition of fake news should exclude other types of general cases. I disagree with this
point since instances of news parody or satire for entertainment purposes should not fall under
the same government regulatory scope as intentional fabricated contents with political agendas.
Further, no reasonable individual would want the government to have such broad regulatory
control over a spectrum of different categories of online communication. In any case, I will
address this point later within my paper. For now, I will assume this definition to illustrate the
moral situation. Additionally, while some scholars may disagree with using the term “fake
news,” I will continue to refer to this definition by its popular name for conciseness and
consistency. With this definition in mind, I will proceed by addressing why fake news is
problematic in our society.

Section 1(b). Why is fake news a problem?
With the concept of fake news established, it will be important to go into why it is a
large problem in our society. With the introduction of the internet and social media there has
been a shift or change in the standards of news information from seeking truth objectivity to
click bait subjectivity. As a result, to paraphrase Ted Koppel, news has transformed from being
“objective and dull” to “subjective and entertaining,” with off-the-cuff opinions replacing the
“old-fashioned concept of reporting” (Hawkins, 2017). This makes it difficult for consumers to
determine what news sources are reliable.
Before the introduction of the internet and social media, it was much easier to
differentiate what was and what was not truthful information. One of the reasons why it was
considerably easier to detect news was that information was typically consumed through a
limited central source such as newspapers, television, and radio. Given these limited venues of
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information, it was much easier to hold accountable news sites for spreading deliberate false
information and propaganda. For example, if a newspaper published a lie about a celebrity or
politician, then they could have been held accountable by being sued for libel or slander in that
situation with the added consequence of having to publish a retraction. Moreover, theses news
sites are held to a higher standard, since journalist must always check all their sources and stand
by a universal code of ethics in journalism.
Notably, fake news can be extremely effective on any citizen as it amplifies our
psychological behaviors and makes us extremely gullible. One of these behaviors that make fake
news seem trustworthy is confirmation bias. Confirmation bias is already an established
behavior that makes us prone to be more decisive and tribal against each other. Indeed, political
ideologies will tend to follow news that associate with their beliefs. However, in the case of fake
news, it becomes more threatening because if a false news report coincides with our bias, we are
more likely to believe it than the actual news. According to Joseph Pierre (2017) from
Psychology Today, consuming information with “fake news” is like “confirmation bias on
steroids...” Additionally, he added that other psychological behavior like “cognitive dissonance,”
the “backfire effect,” and the “Dunning-Kruger Effect” are relevant to the issue of fake news.
According to cognitive dissonance theory, there is a tendency for individuals to seek consistency
among their cognitions (i.e., beliefs, opinions). Similarly, the backfire effect suggests when those
opinions and views are challenged by contradictory evidence, beliefs become strengthened and
reinforced. The Dunning-Kruger effect suggests that the acceptance of fake news originates from
combination of poor self-awareness and low cognitive ability which, results in one
overestimation of capabilities.
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The unaccountability and effects of fake news have led to some taking the opportunity to
gain an advantage in their interests. In this situation, I am referring to political opponents and
rival nations using fake news to harm their adversaries. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union
ran a propaganda campaign of misinformation in which they deliberately but subtly tried to
publish false stories to form a conspiracy that AIDS were a creation by the U.S. that resulted
from secret military experiments (Qiu, 2017). As ridiculous as it may sound, it succeeded in
creating tension, paranoia, and divisiveness among the U.S. and other nations. Dr. Thomas
Boghardt, a military and intelligence historian described the strategy as an approach of
disinformation that is basic, but “works” (Qiu, 2017). In the age of social media, these types of
propaganda campaign are still occurring and are even more effective with the feasibility and
commutative spread ability that social media offers. Additionally, Facebook has admitted that up
to 126 million people saw Russian-bought ads intended to sway the 2016 U.S. election (Isaac &
Wakabayashi, 2017). A 2018 study found that fake news had at least significant role in reducing
voter support of Hillary Clinton on Election Day (Gunther et al., 2018). To emphasize, there is a
consensus among the political science literature that fake news can be utilized as a political
strategy of disinformation and misinformation to gain influence on social media or achieve
political agendas (Lazer et al., 2017).
More recently, a report sent to the U.S. senate concluded that Russia had authorized a
campaign of online disinformation that was designed to polarize the US public and interfere in
elections by creating distrust of US institutions in African American and Hispanic voter’s
populations voters and persuading to “boycott elections or follow the wrong voting procedures.”
Moreover, the campaign focused equally in “spreading sensationalist, conspiratorial, and other
forms of junk political news and misinformation to voters across the political spectrum.”

8

(DiResta et al., 2018). Shockingly, the report also states that this campaign of online
disinformation continued even after being caught interfering in the 2016 election (DiResta et al.,
2018). Given this information, it is evident how effective a political opponents method of
propaganda and misinformation can be utilized through fake news.1
With this in mind, fake news can lead to serious harm in a variety of different ways. The
most prominent obvious harm that people attribute to fake new relates to democratic
participation. In this case, malevolent agents with ulterior political motives publish and distribute
online false information to certain groups to influence voter opinion on certain candidates in each
election. Perhaps the most publicized example of this situation occurred in the 2016 Presidential
election between candidates Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton. As mentioned before, the
malevolent agent suspected here would be Russian intelligence and programmed bots (Howard et
al, 2018). Additionally, other democratic sovereign states have recently accused fake news for
affecting their elections. Hambrecht (2018) concluded that across four different western
countries, fake news strategically targeted different politically polarized communities with
different issues. With the growing number of autonomous states with electoral systems reporting
the occurrence of fake news, it does not appear that this epidemic will decrease in future years.
Although fake news has been derided for influencing democratic elections, it affects have
also led to other dangerous consequences as well. To elaborate, online disinformation that has
maliciously targeted certain groups or people has resulted in physical harms being committed.

1

Not only are rival nations like Russia resorting to methods of distorting information for their political interests, but
party partisan and ideological groups/ individuals are also committing to these acts in their posts and shares, whether
knowingly or unknowingly. Indeed, according to an Oxford study conducted that focused on sites known for
publishing misinformation, they found over 48,000 Facebook and 14,000 Twitter accounts that tend to post false
information, with far-right groups producing the most fake news (Whittaker, 2018). Regardless, the result has had
the same effect of negatively affecting citizens in a society. As it can be seen, without the ability to hold accountable
fake news, there seems to be no incentive for political opponents or rival nations to not use this as a strategy for
political interests.
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These harms are caused by uninformed denizens that were influenced to act by false information
read online. Types of actions that have resulted in these harms include threats, harassment, or
physical violence. The best example of such a harm caused by fake news would be the
conspiracy theory of Pizzagate. This debunked theory that was prevalent during the 2016
presidential election suggested that democratic candidate Hillary Clinton and several other highranking officials of the Democratic Party were involved in human trafficking. More specifically,
there was alleged child sex ring that that involved the Washington D.C. restaurant Comet Ping
Pong. Within a relatively short time, this conspiracy spread all over social media is partly
credited to Russia accounts and political opponents (Rob, 2017).
In particular, this conspiracy theory resulted in a man from North Carolina to formulate a
belief that this information was authentic and objectively true. This belief resulted in him
traveling to Comet Ping Pong to investigate this conspiracy and firing a rifle inside the
restaurant, which endangered the lives of many innocent people. Alongside this fact, the
restaurant owner and staff began to receive several death threats by individuals who believed the
fake news to be true. These examples of the Pizzagate case exemplify how fabricated false
content that was formulated with a malicious intention can influence people to act in harmful
manners that result in physical consequences. There are cases of Pizzagate that have had the
same effect that have led to similar problematic cases. Indeed, fake news has led individuals to
act harmfully towards others. For these reasons, fake news poses a harmful problem toward
society.
Section 1(c). Government intervention and the moral situation.
In establishing this general problem that fake news has presented for society, I will
narrow this general problem to focus on addressing whether governments should intervene to
address this issue. That is to say that while there are multiple parties that may be involved in
10

providing a solution to this problem, my central focus will be on examining whether
governments should be involved in this solution. To prevent the spread of this epidemic and
eliminate the dissemination of fake news, several government institutions have chosen to
respond with legal measures by enacting legislation or public policies that are intended to
regulate fake news. Specifically, these legislative actions and policies are designed to reduce the
prevalence of fake news as they have defined it. While there are several types of relatively noncontroversial actions that governments can take, such as actions of compelled disclosure or
labeling (rating) the content , there are a particular set of actions that will raise controversy.
In detail, there are two types of possible actions that a government can take when
regulating speech that may raise controversy. The first type of action consists of regulating the
speech itself such as the removal of the content. The second type of action consists of the
prosecution of the agent that generated and published the fabricated false content. This type of
action would range from forcing to pay a specific fee to imprisonment depending the country.
The accountable agent would be prosecuted on either an individual level or a more abstract level
like prosecuting the technological company that is responsible for the social media platform. To
illustrate, Philosopher Alvin Goldman suggested that, “One [action] consists of attempts to
eliminate or reduce these kinds of postings, especially on platforms with a readership in the
multimillion range [while the] ... second is to take punitive action against some actor – either the
purchaser of the Facebook ad or Facebook itself” (Goldman, 2017, p.13). In continuing forward,
I will refer to the former action as category (A) type regulation and the latter as category (B) type
regulation.
With this categorization in mind, several different government bodies have pursued one
or both method types to prevent the spread of fake news. In regards to the category (A),
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Germany’s Network Enforcement Act, which was passed in 2017, imposes fines of 50 million
euros or U.S. dollars to social media tech companies if they fail to remove “illegal content”
within 24 hours upon receiving a complaint (Haciyakupuglu et al., 2018). Democratic countries
such as France have followed suit in this precedent by drafting legislation enabling candidates or
political parties to bring an immediate halt, by court order, to the publication of information
deemed to be false within three months of a national election (Fighting 'fake news' with the law,
2018). Both Category A cases exemplify more of a focus on reducing the effect that a fake news
publication may have on large groups.
In contrast, category (B) responses are more interested in holding accountable the agent
that published the false news information. In this category, sovereign countries such as Italy have
proposed taking limited measures of only having agents, who have been proven guilty, of facing
comparable fines that have been directed towards social media companies. In addition, the U.S.
has further proposed that the companies also be required to disclose relevant information
regarding the agent(s) that place the fake news post in their media platform (Haciyakupuglu et
al., 2018). In the case of U.S., the purpose of this requirement is to be able to gather credible
evidence about who created the false information and, ultimately, hold them accountable. At the
same time, however, other countries have taken more extreme measures in their regulation of
fake news. Rather than focusing on the social media tech company, some countries have focused
on holding individual agents responsible with harsher punishments. Indeed, countries such as
Malaysia, Brazil, and the Philippines have gone so far as to propose and enact legislation that
subject convicted proven criminals to large hefty fees or imprisonment time for more than three
years (“Fighting 'fake news' with the law”, 2018). Regardless, both types of responses showcase
how governments are responding to this current political issue.
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In any case, the responses by these governments in countering fake news has prompted
several critics and human rights organizations to object and criticize these forms of actions as
violation of freedom of expression. In particular, Germany’s new law has caused media and
human rights organizations to been to oppose the law since it first appeared in draft form. The
Global Network Initiative, which is comprised of nongovernmental organizations, academics,
investors, and companies committed to free expression and privacy online, said the law would be
“described as a measure to combat hate speech and disinformation online, but its potential
impact would be broader censorship of the internet” (“Proposed German Legislation Threatens
Free Expression Around the World, 2017”). At the same time, countries such as the Philippines
and Malaysia, have passed legislation that with similar criticism and scrutiny. Clarissa David,
communications professor at the University of the Philippines, has argued that, "There is no
demand for new legislation against fake news in the population of these countries [...] The
demand seems to be coming from politicians who feel slighted by some story that went
viral"(Tani,2018).
While there are practical or specific reasons that many advocates are against regulation,
there is an underlying moral reason that motivates these advocates to react harshly against the
government’s actions. In this case, the moral reason is upholding the ideal to protect all human
individuals’ right to freely speak their thoughts and opinions. Intuitively, we would never allow
governments to unjustly regulate or prosecute individuals for speaking or expressing themselves,
especially in online communication. However, the moral conflict between fake news and free
speech is raised when we must ask if it would ever be permissible for governments to regulate or
intervene in situations such as fake news. Is there any valid justification for governments to
intervene? Does the type of regulation (A or B) matter in terms of justifiably regulating online
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speech? Given that social media and the internet are emerging channels of communication, there
has not yet been a precedent set to address this contemporary problem. I have already established
there is valid concern to be had with fake news given the problematic effects it has on society. At
the same, however, there is a justified fear that if governments begin to regulate online
communication, violations of free speech will occur. As a result, there is an ambiguous moral
conflict present between protecting the value of free speech but also resolving the problem of
fake news.
Accordingly, the best account of free speech should be able to adequately address and
resolve this moral conflict. In this case, I will argue that Seana Shiffrin’s thinker-based account
of free speech is not only a compelling view of free speech, but also one that can address this
problem. More specifically, Shiffrin’s view leaves open the possibility that lies are regulable
because insincere speech lacks the value that other speech encompasses. My intention will be to
apply Seana Shiffrin’s argument against lying to the problem of fake news and address the
concerns raised by critics over this situation. Not only does this position uphold the value of free
speech but it also recognizes the problems that deliberate deception such as fake news may have
on our channels of communication.
Section 2) The Thinker-Based Account to Free Speech
In having established a particular problem with fake news, I will now shift focus to
presenting philosopher Seana Shiffrin’s theory of free speech. In Speech Matters, Shiffrin
introduces her unique theory regarding freedom of speech. Within this account, Shiffrin follows
an autonomy type theory of freedom of speech that emphasizes the central role of participants in
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speech and cognition2. In essence, Shiffrin (2014) takes the position that at the core of all
fundamental interests of, free speech resides as a uniting element that is the development and
maintenance of oneself qua thinker and one’s ability to engage in moral relations with other
thinkers (p. 80). In other words, this account of speech puts the center of attention around
speaker and listener alike as thinkers themselves and recognizes their freedom of thought,
communication, and moral agency. For the rest of this section, I will elaborate on Shiffrin’s
thinker-based account and argue that it is the most compelling account of free speech.
To begin, there are many well-known theories of free speech that emphasize and single
out different reasons and interests for the protection of speech against censorship.3 Indeed, these
interests and reasons have ranged from the promotion of the truth arguments to the need of
public discourse and deliberation in democracies.4 Yet, while there is merit to using these
different interests as a single exclusive foundation for the protection of speech, I argue that one
of the unique features of Shiffrin’s theory is that it builds a foundation of free speech on a
unification of different reasons and interests. That is to say that there is something valuable in
considering the interests and reasons as vastly different in their justifying force but are
nonetheless equal in justifying activities of speech and expression in which an autonomous
individual is motivated to appreciate freedom of speech (Shiffrin, 2011, pp. 84-85). From this
view, a comprehensive unified approach can be argued to free speech that prioritizes valuing and

2

Free Speech theorists such as Brison (1998), Baker (2011), Easton (1995) Strauss (1998), Thomas Scanlon (1972),
and Dworkin (1996) argue for a general value of autonomy that maximizes individuals to self-rule, self-develop, or
exercise some type of rational/intellectual capability. Given this value, the position is against government censorship
or regulation of communication, as it can negatively influence autonomy by preventing individuals from receiving
specific arguments, thoughts, or opinions that are relevant to making autonomous decisions.
3
See Schauer (1982).
4
In this case, protecting free speech allows us rational agents to discern and identify which opinions and spoken
information can be valued as fact or truth, while also determining which information can have valued as false or
misconceived. This discovery or inquiry of truth can only be made possible when all opinions, thoughts, and
expressions are allowed to be presented. Furthermore, for democratic theories, See Meiklejohn (1948); Post (2011);
Weinstein (2011).
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respecting the mind of the individual and its operation. In other words, by focusing on respecting
the individual and their intellectual interest as an autonomous thinker, we can establish a stable
foundation that unifies and connects the fundamental interests we have to free speech.
Accordingly, Shiffrin further establishes this point in stating that:
“My claim is that the interests and needs of the underlying thinker presupposed by all of
those theories underwrite a freedom of speech protection that unites these seemingly
disparate approaches and yields a fairly broad justificatory foundation for the freedom of
speech protection” (Shiffrin, 2014, p. 85).
For other theories to disregard the autonomy of the individual’s mind and freedom of thought
would seem counterintuitive since they must already presuppose that the autonomy of the
individual and their capacity to express and listen to thoughts is fundamentally valuable to the
various distinct versions of expression. For instance, promotion of truth arguments would not
work or succeed if they openly discredit and minimize the importance of an individual as a
thinker. To explain, the individual has an underlying interest in discovering the truth that extends
beyond a direct specific reason for obtaining the truth. In this case, the individual has an interest
in formulating “true beliefs about themselves, including the contents of their mind, and the
features and forces of the environment from which [the individual] emerges and interacts.”
(Shiffrin, 2011, p. 291) To remove or ignore this interest would result in having an incomplete
understanding of promoting the truth. Naturally, this reasoning can apply to other non-truthrelated speech arguments where the value of the autonomy of the agent is presupposed. Thus, in
taking an approach that values the development and free operation of the individual's mind, a
cohesive unified theory of free speech can be established that takes into account different
interests that relate to speech and expression by using autonomy as the unifying element.
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To further expand on this idea that individuals are autonomous thinkers by accepting that
individual humans have the significant capacities to fulfill intellectual need that relate to being to
being rational, emotional, moral, and perceptual agents (Shiffrin, 2014, p. 86). For Shiffrin
(2014), obtaining, developing, and exercising these capacities amounts to the core of what we
value and find significant about ourselves (p. 86). Indeed, while these capacities may be present
in other non-human entities, we develop these capacities in a uniquely reflective and conscious
way that forms from our agency. No other species or animal deliberately develops or consciously
exercises the capacities as rational humans do.5 Given that these capacities our central to our
autonomous agency, we must find it necessary for government, society, and individuals to
respect and support these capacities and the value they hold. Therefore, Shiffrin argues, we must
inquire the conditions that yield for a substantial theory of free speech that can succeed in this
task.
In order to understand what conditions are necessary to respect and support an
autonomous thinker’s capacities, we should also take into account their “core” fundamental
interests that are tied and connected to these capacities. Accordingly, Shiffrin identifies and lists
some of the important and fundamental interests that rational autonomous agents have when it
comes to our capacities for thought and deliberation of practical judgement, and moral relations:
a. A capacity for practical and theoretical thought.
b. Apprehending the truth.6
c. Exercising the imagination7.
d. Becoming a distinctive individual.
As can be seen, a case can already be built with Shiffrin’s theory against fake news since her theory of free speech
excludes non-rational individuals such as Russian bots on social media.
6
This fundamental interest can be associated with promotion of truth or “marketplace of ideas” type interests, in
which free speech is defended as the only mechanism for truth acquisition (Goldman 2017; Abrams v. United States
1919; Milton 1644). Now, the best method in which society will succeed in aiming for the truth is to allow all
opinions and thoughts to be heard freely to compete with other thoughts and opinions for evaluation and criticism.
7
This fundamental interest refers to an interest for individuals to express themselves through artistic activities such
as the arts, publications of fiction, music, film etc.
5
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e. Moral agency.
f. Responding authentically.
g. Living among others.8
h. Appropriate recognition and treatment.9
Of course, this list of fundamental interests is not an exhaustive list of fundamental
interests but, nevertheless, highlights some of the key ones that are separate, independent and
distinct from the specific interests regarding our own self-interests, projects, and desires in a
given situation (Shiffrin, 2011, p. 291). While some of these interests are self-evident, others
require and are offered more detailed explanation. For example, the ability to exercise one’s
imagination (fundamental interest c.) is an important interest to the thinker since it allows any
rational individual the opportunity to exercise their creativity to create new artistic works
(Shiffrin, 2014, p. 86). More often than not, artists, fiction writers, and filmmakers will have
such an intellectual interest that helps develop their perceptual capacities and create great bodies
of work. Each interest mentioned enhances the agent’s self-development, knowledge (of oneself,
others, the environment etc.), opportunities to develop intellectual capacities and the “intellectual
prerequisites” of moral relations (Shiffrin, 2011, 291). As it can be seen, these fundamental
interests are vital components that help understand the intellectual conditions for autonomous
thinker to develop and operate their mind freely.
With this in mind, Shiffrin (2014) argues that in order to respect and support the
capacities and interests of the autonomous thinker, it is necessary to have “protected
opportunities” to speak and think freely (p. 88). In other words, free speech and expression are
essential to the appropriate development and functioning of thinkers and their intellectual
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interests. The reason being that the communicative abilities of speech and expressions are the
only “public avenues” in which one can precisely claim their individuality. To put it in another
way, speech and expression are the only methods in which an autonomous thinker can be able to
successfully represent the contents on their own mind and thoughts to be able to distinctly
represent themselves to others. Without the ability to speak or express ourselves, how would an
individual be able to sincerely express their thoughts, personality, creativity, moral and political
views to others? In this case, it seems that communicating the contents of our mind is the only
method in which we can further our interest of being recognized by other individuals. At the
same time, speech and expression improves our social and moral development since
communicating with others outside our minds allows us to appreciate and recognize others
different perspectives and ideas, while also taking them into consideration when forming our
own beliefs (Shiffrin, 2014, p. 88). As Shiffrin (2014) argues, communication, “makes possible
complex forms of social life that demand specialization and epistemic cooperation” (p. 89).
An important point to keep in mind is that Shiffrin’s argument is asserting an intrinsic
value here by claiming the importance of distinguishing our individuality and engaging in moral
and social relations as autonomous thinkers.10 The intrinsic value here is that expressing and
listening to thoughts and opinions is valuable in its own right, as it allows ourselves to
autonomously distinct from one another. As Shiffrin (2014) clarifies, “it is important in itself that
one be known as the distinctive individual one is. It is also essential for one to be fully respected
by others and therefore able to engage in full moral relations with others” (p. 89). From the
moral agency and duty perspective, we cannot begin to respect and treat others as autonomous
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individuals without access to their thoughts and content of their mind at their own choosing. For
instance, consider a situation in which thinker (1) is at moral or political disagreement with
thinker (2). In order to be able to escape this deadlock and reach a peaceful settlement or
compromise, both individuals need to be able authentically understand and respect where the
other is coming from. However, to get to that point of mutual respect requires that we be able to
communicate with one another authentically and share both our perspectives. While there is
certainly the good consequence of maintaining peace in this example, the intrinsic value of this
communication between the two ways of acquiring mutual respect for one another as
autonomous thinkers require communication. Even if no agreement came about, the intrinsic
value of these two individuals communicating with each other would exist. Nevertheless, this
perennial value between the two individuals is the point Shiffrin is trying to emphasize in her
argument.
The complexity of mental thought and content prevents anyone (unless you have
telepathy) to be able to discern, identify, or recognize the thoughts and ideas of individuals
without explicit external and linguistic representation/articulation. In this case, externally
communicating complex thoughts or ideas is the only way in which they can be fully formulated
or realized. As Shiffrin states, “some thoughts may only be fully identified and known to
themselves if made linguistically or representationally explicit” (Shiffrin, 2014, p.89). Indeed,
how could a philosopher ever be able to articulate and externalize their profound complex theory
without oral, written, or symbolic speech? Even a mime is expressing some form of
communication with their hand movements. In detail, Shiffrin’s key point is that “rational human
thinkers need access to other thinkers under conditions in which their mental contents may be
known with some degree of precision….” (Shiffrin, 2014, p. 90).
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In addition, if the mental contents in our mind are the source to our individuality and
developing our moral and social relations, then anything that prevents us from communicating
those contents to others would severely hinder or disrupt our intellectual capacities and
development (Shiffrin, 2014, pp. 89-91). In an example that loosely mirrors Shiffrin’s solitary
confinement situation, imagine a situation in which an individual’s plane crashes into a deserted
island with no life on it. As the only survivor of the plane crash, the person spends the next
twenty years alone without any social interaction. As a result, this person that was forced into
isolation will suffer from mental and emotional conflict that will make them to begin,
“progressively losing their grip on reality, suffering hallucinations and paranoia; maybe become
psychotic” (Shiffrin, 2014, p.90). In a sense, such isolation is a result of an absence from
“bilateral communication” and social interaction (Shiffrin, 2014, p. 91). Similarly, while not as
extreme as this isolation example, restricting freedom of speech and expression bears a similar
disruption of our intellectual capacities and interests. Hence, it is necessary for us as thinkers to
have a broad far-ranging access to the ability to authentically externalize and make known of our
mental content in order to properly development ourselves as individuals and improve our social
and moral relations.
As such, any form of legal or government regulation must be consistent with the
protection of the free development and operation of the thinker’s mind. In particular, Shiffrin
mentions three main ways in which governmental or legal regulation may be inconsistent with
this protection. Firstly, the most obvious inconsistency of legal or government regulation that
attempts to remove or ban either the activities/materials necessary for the free development and
operation of the thinker’s mind or simply banning that freedom itself. The second inconsistency
is that of action, effects, and materials of legal or government regulation that interfere with the
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free development and operation of the thinker’s mind. Lastly, the rationale behind legal or
government regulation must also be consistent with the protection of the thinker’s mind (Shiffrin,
2014, pp. 92-93). Hence, this theory prioritizes the individual thinker’s intellectual interest in the
protection of the free development and operation of their mind.
In short, Seana Shiffrin formulated an autonomy type theory of freedom of speech that
focuses on the thinker and their intellectual interests. Indeed, Shiffrin takes the normative
approach of protecting freedom of thought. Specifically, the protection of the free development
and operation of the thinker’s mind. Ideally, free speech is essential to the development,
functioning, and operation of thinkers. Moreover, speech plays an integral role in developing our
capacity for moral agency since in order to respect others we are required to understand and
recognize their perspective as autonomous individuals. Without a doubt, Shiffrin’s theory makes
a compelling case as to why we should intrinsically value free speech. Having established this
theory of free speech, I will now move forward in arguing why it is the most compelling account
of free speech.
Section 2b) Why the thinker based-account is so compelling?
Before moving on to Shiffrin’s argument against lying, I would like to take the time to
briefly discuss why Shiffrin’s account of free speech should be taken seriously among different
competing accounts. Primarily, a distinguishing feature to immediately take notice in Seana
Shiffrin’s unique thinker-based account is that it resembles similar deontological arguments for
justifying freedom of speech.11 In particular, Shiffrin’s account closely follows an autonomybased theory that emphasizes an intrinsic aim to protect speech in order to promote the
development and free operation of the mind and the intellectual fundamental interests for all
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individuals. Indeed, this thinker-based approach presupposes that the autonomous individual
agent “fundamentally matters” and that a “well-functioning system of social cooperation and
justice” requires that it’s “citizens, by and large, have active, well-developed moral
personalities” (Shiffrin, 2014, pp 85, 92). In any case, I will make the strong claim that this
approach is a compelling theoretical account of freedom of speech. No question, this thinkerbased approach is able to unify the different interests of contemporary speaker-based, listenerbased, truth-based, and democratic-based arguments to understand why speech is valuable on
multiple levels (Shiffrin. 2014, 84). In the following section, I will have two objectives in mind
in order to successfully assert this claim that Shiffrin's account is a compelling account of
freedom of speech I will: (1) introduce different unique features of Shiffrin’s theory that makes it
appealing and (2) defend this account against the standard objections that may pose a challenge
to Shiffrin.
Accordingly, I will begin to explain and defend some of the compelling features of
Shiffrin’s thinker-based account. Firstly, I will explain how this account has a universal
applicability that is comparable to a human right of free speech. Unquestionably, the thinkerbased account succeeds in fulfilling this condition as it based on intuitive, non-contingent factors
that do not rely on institutional justifications. In this case, Shiffrin’s (2014) identification of
foundation and central interests of moral agents, which are separate from their immediate desires
or projects, are uncontroversially applicable to all human beings (p. 88). It is an unchanging fact
that we all require self-development, exercising our intellectual capabilities, and ‘earning’ with
others in communication and moral relations. Such a fact exemplifies that if every human has an
intrinsic value to exercise and develop as autonomous moral agents, then we should allow,
encourage, and make available the opportunities for all human individuals, regardless of
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location, to exercise and develop their intellectual interest as thinkers and prevent any regulatory
institution that prohibits that interest.
Further, this thinker-based theory is more apt to give broad and direct free speech
protection to a wide range of different instances of expression or speech (Shiffrin, 2011, p. 299).
Unlike democratic theories of free speech, Shiffrin’s value of speech is not grounded on the basis
of contingent institutional rationales.12 Under Shiffrin’s thinker-based view, free speech is
valuable on such a universal scale because it focuses on the relationships and self-development
that we all have toward each other and such a fact can extend to the most private of
conversations. Of course, Shiffrin’s theory also acknowledges at the same time why governments
should also uphold free speech. According to Shiffrin (2014), “Freedom of speech is a
precondition of fostering moral agency, which in turn is a presupposition of functioning
governments of equals-a commitment even the sparest liberal theories affirms” (p. 81).
Moreover, Shiffrin (2014) is quick to add that the authentic meaningfulness and operation of the
“democratic polity” is dependent on citizens having generally “strong and independent capacities
for thought” (p. 92). As a result, Shiffrin’s argument succeeds on multiple levels (institutional
and moral), which further adds to its universality as a human right.
Nevertheless, there is a potential worry to this theory that limits this account as a human
right. Under this account, Shiffrin’s account may be interpreted as supporting a form of elitism
by over-intellectualizing what speech and expression means to people (Blasi, 2011, pp.110-112).
The primary focus of this theory rests on individuals having intellectual interests and capacities
that require development and free operation. However, this intellectual focus on thinkers appears
to be overly rational and will result in only taking seriously highly deliberate forms of articulate
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speech. Such a consequence would exclude those individuals whose priorities are not based on
intellectual interests and, even worse, exclude those individuals who are mentally disabled from
thought (e.g., children and mentally disabled). How can one argue, as a result, that free speech is
a human right if it that excludes protecting certain kinds of people simply because they
expression or speech is not sophisticated enough?
This objection, I say, misinterprets Shiffrin’s classification of the “thinker”. For one
thing, Shiffrin’s theory does not demand that individuals should be highly intellectual,
philosophical beings who are on a journey of knowledge and thought. Instead, Shiffrin is
advocating for the position that all human beings have fundamental interests to develop their
capacities and to have the opportunity to articulate their thoughts and content of their mind, no
matter how simple minded or lowbrow. To put it another way, Shiffrin does not want to restrict
her classification of thinkers to only discursively cognitive individuals. As she explains, “all such
thinkers have interests in developing the capacities they possess, in having opportunities to
externalize their mental content both to determine what they endorse and affiliate with and to
allow themselves to be understood by others and in having access to the thoughts of others.”
(Shiffrin, 2014, p.102). Thus, the thinker-based account argues for fundamental elements that
originate and apply to all human beings, regardless of origin or intellectual differences. The
universal applicability of Shiffrin's theory is more than enough compelling evidence to
demonstrate that it is compatible with a human right.
Secondly, I argue that Shiffrin’s thinker-based account is able to address the issue of
content discrimination. Content discrimination refers to regulation that targets messages or acts
of speech based on its content. This type of regulation is problematic because it allows the
government the opportunity to insert their own bias, values, and judgments when evaluating
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controversial acts of speech. In the case of fake news, governments would regulate online
information on personal views of the content or to serve a political agenda such as silencing
political opponents. Therefore, it seems safe to say that any account of free speech should
address whether governmental authority should be expected to evaluate cases of speech with an
objective mind-set and avoid the problem of content discrimination.13 This conclusion seems to
follow with has been established since, in the Supreme Court case of Ashcroft v. American Civil
Liberties Union (2004), the Court said that “government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” Additionally, Justice Robert
Jackson in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943) stressed the point that “If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in … matters of opinion….”
In our case, Shiffrin addresses this problem by building a strict criterion to restrict
government regulation of speech. To repeat, Shiffrin (2014) focuses on three cooperative
principles that are based on the protection of the free operation and development of the mind (p.
92). Accordingly, these principles restrict the government from:
(1) Banning or attempting to ban free development and operation of a person’s mind
of those activities or materials necessary for this free development and operation
(2) promulgating legal materials or otherwise acting in ways may objectionably
interfere with the free development and operation of a person’s mind;
(3) Acting on any rationale for the materials, or the activity, may be inconsistent with
valuing this protection.
In a general sense, this theory would not permit the regulation of speech based on reasons of
content, since such a step would interfere with the free development and operation of the mind.
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As Shiffrin (2014) explains, “this view makes no important distinction, at the foundations,
between speech about aesthetics, one’s mental condition and treatment, one’s regard for another,
one’s sensory perception, the sense or lack thereof of the existence of a God, or one’s political
beliefs” (pp. 92-93). Under these principles, no government should be able to regulate speech or
expression for reasons that focus on the contents of one’s beliefs or thoughts. In other words,
content discrimination would impede on the authentic development and operation of the
thinker’s mind.
With this conclusion in mind, a possible objection to the thinker-based approach is that,
without features such as content discrimination, this theory will be overly restrictive on the
regulation of speech, especially in cases in which we intuitively think speech ought to be
regulated such as preventing harm. To this objection, I reply that Shiffrin’s theory would allow
government intervention to be permissible under conditions and reasons that would have the
potential to conflict and violate other values, particularly those regarding autonomy. To
illustrate, consider an individual in a public place speaking out against corn dealers who starve
the poor. Under the thinker-based account, government intervention would only be permissible if
the speaker called to arms an angry mob to directly harm any corn dealers they come across by.
The thinker-based account would allow for appropriate limitations to free speech and for
governments to intervene under two possible reasons. The first notable reason would be that the
speech was a direct instigator of harm. Such expression would go against respecting others’
autonomy and developing moral relations with one another. If the speech had focused instead
been articulated as an explanation on an opinion such as explaining how the labor and product of
corn dealers leads to economic inequality, then government intervention would not be
permissible.
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The second possible reason would be that such speech had the intend to manipulate
individual’s thoughts and actions. In this case, the speaker was fully aware that corn dealer does
not starve the poor, but, nonetheless wanted to create chaos by manipulating people’s actions to
an “angry mob, ready to explode” (Mill, 2017). As Shiffrin stated in her reply to critics, some
forms of thought control may take the form of speech (e.g. hypnotic, bombarding, etc.). The
thinker-based view would explain why that form of speech would not fall under the free speech
protection but, rather, why that speech could be limited (Shiffrin, 2011, p.419). In this case, the
speaker is actively trying to interfere in a manner that is inconsistent with any of fundamental
interests mentioned by Shiffrin such as sharing ideas or beliefs and evaluating to form an
opinion. Nevertheless, these actions of regulation remain consistent with addressing the problem
of content discrimination since it does not target the content of the speech or expression.
Thirdly, one of the compelling features about Shiffrin’s thinker-based account is that it is
able to adequately address the dispute between listener-oriented approaches and speaker-oriented
approaches to free speech. There is a prominent dispute regarding whether a right of free speech
is meant to protect listeners or speakers.14 A right of a listener would make the valid claim of
free speech that, listeners have a right to focused to receive messages/opinions or access ideas
without governmental interference. In contrast, a right of a speaker would be asserting free
speech claims on behalf of the speaker. In this case, the dispute regarding this distinction is
determining whether speakers have free speech rights. Surprisingly, there are many accounts of
free speech who would say that freedom of speech protects listeners, not speakers.
For Shiffrin, this conflict seems bewildering since both of these approaches alone neglect
key fundamental interests that we intuitively think would be relevant to free speech, but
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nevertheless cannot be addressed when choosing to take either approaches by itself. For instance,
listener-based theories insist that listeners have a right to “access information” and obtain useful
content from others. However, this approach fails to explain why we should protect activities of
speech that is neither useful to the listener nor are they important to access since it is redundant,
incoherent, ill-informed, or repetitive information (Shiffrin, 2014, p.83). At the same time,
speaker based approaches, which maintain that the speaker has an interest in having the ability to
articulate and communicate their ideas, cannot explain why listeners may have an interest in
accessing such communication. As a result, both approaches alone, Shiffrin (2014) thinks, seem
to be “objectively partial and mysterious” when considering the concepts of free speech (p. 83).
Certainly, there does not seem to be substantial reason to suggest that both approaches inherently
contradict each other. For this reason, Shiffrin argues for a unifying and central theory that can
adequately address the interests of both speakers and listeners.
Unsurprisingly, Shiffrin’s thinker-based account is able to take this unifying approach
and recognize the multiple different interests involved in different cases of free speech. Indeed,
Shiffrin’s (2014) approach would not attempt to “focus predominantly on either side of the
speaker-listener relationship, but rather on the thinker’s interest as such” (p. 95). To put it
another way, this refusal to formulate a dichotomy between speakers and listeners allows Shiffrin
to converge these different interests into a comprehensive view that is able to consider them as
individual interests. In order for individuals to understand, develop, and endorse beliefs, ideas, or
thoughts, we need to have the free ability to “externalize” those thoughts and “identify them as
particulars” to evaluate them. As Shiffrin (2014) explains, “some thoughts may only be fully
identified and known to themselves if made linguistically or representationally explicit” (pp. 8990). At the same time, however, in order to fully accept ideas and thoughts as true beliefs, we
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need to have insight into other individual’s beliefs and thoughts as a way to compare and contrast
their differences. Shiffrin (2014) is on point when she says that, “we need the help of others’
insight and beliefs, as well as, their reactions and evaluative responses to our responses” (p. 90).
In a Millian-type manner, we can only reject false beliefs when we allow them to be expressed
and be evaluated by ourselves and others.15 Of course, Shiffrin does not take this truth benefit
reason for this position but instead argues that it will further assist us in the development and free
operation of our intellectual capabilities. Thus, this central approach of unifying both speaker
and listener interests only adds further weight to the value of Shiffrin’s theory.
Finally, the thinker-based account is able provide a satisfactory answer to the issue of
under-inclusivity and over-inclusivity of different activities of speech or expression. Given the
amount of different activities that would be categorized as speech, there is an ongoing dispute as
to what is the exact range of the type of activities that should be protected under free speech. The
type of activities that could be considered free speech can widely vary from a range of political
speech to various art forms. Notably, Shiffrin’s theory proves to be extremely successful on this
front since it takes the position of being applicable to the widest range of activities of speech or
expression. As she states:
The mental contents that figure in the thinker’s well-functioning as such include not only
implicit and explicit theoretical and practical reasoning but also the emotions,
non-discursive thoughts, images, sounds, and other perceptions and sensations, as
well as the workings of the imagination.” (Shiffrin, 2014, p. 81)
Significantly, unless there was substantial reason to say otherwise, this theory does not limit the
type of activities to only traditional items would be considered speech by a human agent.
Although this result may be true, the more compelling point in Shiffrin taking this wide stance is
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that she is able to justify these vastly different activities under the theoretical premise that we
must support our intellectual capabilities (e.g., rational, emotional, moral, perceptual, and
sentience etc.) (Shiffrin, 2014, p.86). From there, she posits a non-exhaustive, but sufficient to
display the point, list of conditions (a-f) in which every human individual “qua thinker” has a
specific interest that develops these capacities (Shiffrin, 2014, p 86). Naturally, these conditions
she asserts can unify and explain how a wide range of different speech activities can support the
thinker-based idea of the free operation and development of the mind.
With this position of inclusivity in mind, there are two objections that attempt to argue
that Shiffrin’s position is either too narrow or too broad to justify protecting different activities
of speech. The first objection is a weak one in which it argues that by focusing on the
development of the thinker, it neglects protecting speech that has no connection to thinkeroriented needs, namely, protecting the access to the speech of those who are deceased and no
longer meet the qualifications of the thinker (e.g., Shakespeare) . In this case, Shiffrin argues
from listener-based standpoint, that these situations there are activities of speech or expression
that still give relevant “insight, perspective, and information,” that is to be conveyed, even after
death. Indeed, how can we make progress in theater arts, science or philosophy without
understanding the “history and information contained within the historical perspectives”
(Shiffrin, 2011, p.431)? The thinker-based account addresses this concern further by establishing
that it can protect the speech of the deceased on the basis that thinkers qua speakers have an
interest or moral duty to communicate with future generations and contribute their thoughts and
beliefs even after death. In other words, the artist does did not only produce magnificent
artworks to communicate certain themes to only individuals during the time they are alive, but
also to future generations after their death. Admittedly, Shiffrin (2011) concedes that regulation
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or restrictions on disturbing the intellectual property of the speech of the dead, but such a
consequence does not pose a significant challenge to the theory (p. 431).
The second objection, which originates from James Weinstein, is much stronger and
focuses on the over-inclusivity of activities of speech. To explain, Weinstein’s argument is a
much stronger response to Shiffrin’s account since it raises the concern regarding dilution. In
effect, the wide domain of activities that Shiffrin’s account protects will eventually result in
generating two problems. Firstly, Weinstein (2011) objects to the thinker-based account on the
grounds that it does not provide a stronger form of protection for “political speech and, in
particular, for incendiary speech and other forms of dissent" that relate to the public discourse”
(pp. 384-385). In other words, this broad protection of free speech will lessen the importance and
distinction of protecting certain kinds of speech such political speech. The second concern
Weinstein (2011) had about the over-inclusivity of free speech was that it would broadly protect
activities of speech that we would intuitively not prefer to protect such as harassing speech or
types of dangerous scientific research that would be harmful to society (Weinstein, 2011, pp.
390-393). In contrast, these two concerns regarding dilution would be avoidable if one were to
accept a more “modest theory” that highlighted specific “core” types of speech that would as
more secure than types of activities that were considered less than the core types of speech
(Shiffrin, 2011, p.426). Such a modest approach would avoid having to protect counterintuitive
types of speech since it would be distinguished as not part of the core types of speech.
To address Weinstein’s first point, there is no denying that the thinker-based account
does not endorse the idea of prioritizing certain core types of speech as political speech.
Certainly, Shiffrin would concede to this point since she argues that activities of speech should
encompass equal “foundational protection.” In other words, there should not be a “lexical
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hierarchy of value between” the different activities of speech, “nor should the protections for
some depend dominantly on their playing an instrumental role in securing the conditions for the
flourishing practice of another” (Shiffrin, 2011, p.285). Indeed, the thinker-based account
explains how different activities of speech (whether they be political or not) satisfy the
conditions in which individuals can differently cultivate their intellectual capabilities.
This resolve to remain neutral and give equal protection to other forms of speech, I argue
is the correct decision since the alternative position of giving greater protection to political
speech creates substantial problems for any theory of free speech. For one thing, taking the
position that political speech should be given higher protection assumes the idea that activities of
speech and expression can be divided into categories of expression and speech based on content.
This categorization creates two substantial problems. The first problem is that there is no
substantial justifiable basis to establish definitive lines that can adequately separate different
categories of activities from one another. An important point to realize is that activities of speech
that were once-characterized as non-political can become relevant to the political discourse in an
instant and equally non-relevant a moment later. That is to say that we cannot establish definitive
categorization lines since it will constantly fluctuate and overlap on multiple occasions.
Moreover, Larry Alexander (2005) makes the crucial point that categorizing different types of
speech and giving greater value over one category of speech vs another will inevitably lead to
some authority inserting their own values as to what activities of speech garner higher protection
(pp. 141-142). The result will most likely generate a violation of evaluative neutrality.
Hence, Weinstein’s concern to the thinker-based account would only generate substantial
problems for the theory.
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The second concern Weinstein had about the over-inclusivity of free speech was that it
would protect activities of speech that we would intuitively not prefer to protect such as
harassing speech or types of scientific research that would be harmful to society (Weinstein,
2011, pp. 390-393). To address the harassment claim, Shiffrin argues that these types of speech
activities might be distinguished as a non-consensual communicative relation. While Shiffrin’s
account may endorse the idea that individuals should be able to express themselves, it does not
allow individuals to invade the privacy or command/force other individuals to engage with them
against their interests. To allow such actions would be inconsistent with respecting the other
individual’s autonomy since thinkers will have an interest in maintaining “a sphere of privacy” at
times in order to avoid intrusions by others that may interrupt their “mental agenda.” (Shiffrin,
2011, p. 434). For example, college students needing focus on their studies will want to go to the
library in order to maintain a sphere of privacy to avoid distractions. Now, if someone at the
library starts to play an electric guitar directly at the individual at full volume, then that would be
situation in which such speech would not be protected as it would be non-consensual. Similarly,
if individual 1 was personally harassing individual 2 and they’d ask individual 1 to stop, then
there is substantial evidence to reduce individual 1’s speech as it infringes on individual 2’s
interest in “maintaining a sphere of privacy” (Shiffrin, 2011, p. 435).
Nonetheless, Shiffrin concedes the point that if individual 1 were to engage in a public
setting forum and make outrageous offensive remarks about individual 2, individual 2 would not
have a substantial claim to limit individual 1 speech because individual 2 is not being forced to
listen to those remarks. While this point may appear to exhibit a problem in the theory itself, this
fact is entirely consistent with the current accounts of how governments manage speech in open
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forums and public forum. To illustrate, in public protests, people are able freely make offensive
remarks about political candidates and others who disagree with them.
To address the scientist example, Shiffrin concedes the point that if a scientist were
interested in researching the formula for how to make a deadly toxin, the thinker-based account
would prevent the government from creating a law that would forbid anyone from making this
formula explicitly known on the basis that they are concerned that “terrorist groups may gain
access” (Shiffrin, 2011, p.436). While Shiffrin (2011) concedes this point and realizes the fear of
such a consequence, she points out a greater worry of uncontrolled government regulation based
on “fears, safety, or other matters” (p. 436). To further stress Shiffrin’s point, this objection that
we should restrict individual’s liberty in order to prevent potential harm to society is very
concerning as it can be universally applied to restrict any type of action under such a view.
Consider the relevant example of the internet. Under Weinstein’s rationale, governments should
either restrict access to the internet of citizen users or monitor all conversations made in internet
in order to address the concern that citizens are communicating with terrorist organizations to
attack from within a nation state. Indeed, I agree with Shiffrin that there are cases in which we
have to rely on the “good judgment” of citizens (both listeners and speakers) to determine when
to express potentially harmful information and how to act or use such information responsibly.
(Shiffrin, 2011, p.436) This same standard can be equally applied to political speech, which
Weinstein advocates for, since there are cases in which access to some political speech will also
potentially lead to harmful consequences (e.g., the newspaper publishing top-secret government
information). This further proves the case that there does not seem to be any substantial
difference between political speech and other types of speech. For these reasons, I do not think
there is a substantial claim to suggest that Shiffrin’s theory suffers from over-inclusivity or
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under-inclusivity. Hence, the thinker-based account is able to justifiable its equal wide-range of
protection for free speech.
Seana Shiffrin formulated an autonomy type theory of freedom of speech that focuses on
the thinker and their intellectual interests. Indeed, Shiffrin takes the normative approach of
protecting freedom of thought. Specifically, the protection of the free development and operation
of the thinker’s mind. I argued that that there are attractive features to this theory that make it
compelling among competing theories. In having established this theory as a compelling theory
of free speech, I will now move forward to present Shiffrin’s argument against lying and
applying it to the conflict of fake news.

Section 3) The Argument Against Lying
In the previous section, I have argued for and endorsed a unique position of free speech
by Seana Shiffrin that asserts freedom of speech as an utmost important intrinsic value to
individual thinkers. Chiefly, speech and expression is integral for us as individuals to understand
with one another and fulfill the moral duties that require such understanding. At the same time,
we must also maintain protected channels that render reliable communication possible. For this
reason, unchecked and persistent government intervention or regulation of speech would almost
certainly obstruct this value. However, even in this robust theory of free speech, there are cases
in which regulation and government intervention of speech may be reasonably permissible.
Specifically, Shiffrin, in Chapter 4 of Speech Matters, makes the modest claim that insincere and
deliberate lies are not protected by a right of free speech. In other words, legal regulation and
condemnation of lies would remain consistent with the value of free speech traditions. In this
section, I will elaborate on this argument by explaining the distinctive wrongness of lies. From
there, I will demonstrate how a right of free speech would not be threatened by the legal
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regulation of lies. The objective will be to make clear Shiffrin’s key points in order to make a
compelling case that her argument holds merit and can be applied to the conflict between fake
news and free speech.
To begin, I will introduce Shiffrin’s characterization of a lie and explain why it is
distinctively wrong to the thinker. In accordance, we can characterize a lie as an “intentional
assertion by A to B of a proposition P” that meets certain conditions:
1. A does not believe P, and
2. A is aware that A does not believe P, and
3. An intentionally presents P in a manner or context that objectively
manifests A’s intention that B is to take and treat P as an accurate
representation of A’s belief (Shiffrin, 2014, p.12).
In detail, speaker A not believe in proposition P and is completely aware that they do not believe
in it. Nevertheless, person A deliberately communicates P to person B in a “manner or context”16
in which B is to credit P as an accurate representation of A’s beliefs (Shiffrin, 2014, p.12).
Rather than a portrayal of an accurate representation, this communication of a lie can be
described as transmitting a “false representation” of the conscious mental contents, beliefs, or
thoughts of speaker A. 17 To illustrate a clear cut case, consider a conversation between two
individuals named Politician T and Citizen K. In this conversation, K asks T whether T had an
extramarital affair during their elected term. While consciously knowing that he/she did have an
affair, Politician T decides to answer the question by stating that T did not have an extramarital
affair during their elected term. Indeed, as with all cases of lies, it is the “utterance” of the
insincere proposition that results in misrepresenting the contents of the speaker's mind to others.

With “manner or context”, there will be cases in which telling lies may be justified given the context. Shiffrin
refers to these cases as cases of “suspended context”, in which circumstances in which a lie does not require speaker
A to be sincere about their lies. A classic example of a suspended context would be when a parent is telling their
child a false but entertaining fable or story (Shiffrin, 2014, pp.16-28).
17
Frankfurt (1992).
16
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To clarify this point, the act of telling a lie is not co-extensively dependent on falsely
persuading or formulating false beliefs with anyone. There may be cases in which the speaker
does not have the aim to insert a false belief in others but is simply trying to avoid or confront
the truth. In fact, Shiffrin draws an important distinction between lies and deceptions.18 While
both share their unfaithful “commitment to truthful understanding”, the central attribute of a lie
does not depend on person B being falsely persuaded by proposition P (Shiffrin, 2014, p.13). As
Shiffrin states, “it is very odd to think that whether a speaker lies hinges upon the persuasiveness
of the speaker or the credulity of the listener.” A perfect example of this point is the well-known
fable story of The Boy Who Cried Wolf. In this example, a speaker keeps lying to an audience to
a point that results in the listeners no longer believing any claim the speaker makes. Despite both
the speaker and the listener now fully aware that these pathological claims will remain untrue
and will not be persuaded by them, these claims would still be classified as lies since they are
still false assertions meeting all the conditions of a lie. As Shiffrin (2014) explains, a lie would
be a “falsification presented in a context that objectively conveys that the statement is to be taken
as a true representation of the speaker’s beliefs...” (p. 15). Regardless of intent or the success of
deception, lies are asserted in a context where they are meant to taken as a true belief of the
speaker. Thus, we can say that the characterization of the lie does not depend on the intent to
deceive nor its success. 19

18

With deception, cases can be further broken down to morally relevant forms of deception and morally nonrelevant forms of deception. As Shiffrin (2014) states, “not all mistake inferences by an observer or listener involve
deception in the moral relevant sense” (p. 21). Morally relevant cases involve conscious effort to influence the
contents of a listener or allows for “false impression of the facts. “In the case, the moral wrong is that is it a violation
of duty of causing individuals to form false beliefs based on “behavior, communication, and omission.” (p. 22). This
form of deception is intentional and attempts to disrupt the epistemic contents of the listener’s minds.
19
This point is important keep in mind that this argument does not focus on the consequences that occur after the lie
has been communicated. Rather, Shiffrin is focusing on the harm in itself of speaking the lie. This is a crucial point
to remember when considering Shiffrin’s takes a deontological intrinsic position to speech that's avoids a type of
consequentialist harm.
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With this distinction made, lies bear a particular special type of wrongness that abuse and
impair our reliability on the mechanisms that allows us to communicate as thinkers. To repeat,
speech and expression are the only mechanisms in which we can make precise direct
communication of our mental contents. As Shiffrin (2014) notes, we lack direct access to the
contents of one another’s minds” (p. 9). Without violating the autonomy of others, the only
moral method of retrieving these epistemic contents from others is through direct communication
or testimony (i.e., speech).20 However, these methods are “fragile” mechanisms of
communication that entail an authentic and accurate representation of people’s mental content
(Shiffrin, 2014, p.25). Accordingly, these mechanisms are essential and must be safeguarded “if
we are to understand and cooperate with one another to achieve our mandatory moral ends [and
fundamental interests]” (Shiffrin, 2014 p.118). Indeed, these mechanisms of communication
allow us to function as moral agents and fulfil our moral and political duties.21
Now, if we allow our method of communication to be misused by lying, it would
compromise our “rational basis” to support mutual dependence of testimonies or communication
with others (Shiffrin, 2014, p. 117). Deliberately lying in these types of settings threatens the
“trust and reliance on others testimonies,” This trust and reliance can be described as a mutual
epistemic dependence that allows us to perceive the facts and knowledge of the world while
forming moral beliefs about it. As a result, lying impedes upon this mutual epistemic cooperation

This claim is consistent with Shiffrin’s (2014) view that speech is the only precise method of retrieving these
contents since other methods such as reading facial expressions, observing behavior, and making inferences give us
only “rough” and semi-accurate pictures of one’s thoughts (p. 10). According to Shiffrin, speech is the only
authoritative epistemic source of one’s mind that triumphs above others since the speaker is the only one to have the
ability to directly access their own mind.
21
As Shiffrin (2014) notes, the political process requires that in order to be able to respond to what an opposing or
other side believes is right, we need to be able to fully understand and be clear on that sides opinion/belief to give an
“appropriate response” to it (p.9). Moreover, moral situations are complex, unclear, and demand that we take into
account thoughts and sentiments of those involved, which requires some form of communicative knowledge on their
part (pp. 9-10).
20
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that we as thinkers require to develop and express our thoughts. Particularly, these actions are
even more alarming in situations where listeners have to rely on the testimonies of individuals
with exclusive information, such as individuals who are in a position of higher authority
(Shiffrin, 2014, p. 131). For instance, as a student in a classroom, I am epistemically dependent
on my teacher to relay accurate information of a particular subject. At the same, the teacher will
also be dependent on my testimony in many situations such as receiving feedback in order to
improve their teaching methods. Unfortunately, if we allowed deliberate lies and
misrepresentation to be a part of mechanisms of communication, it would hinder this mutual
dependence by deteriorating and reducing the reliability of accessing accurate representation of
one’s information and mental contents. As Shiffrin (2014) states, “if universalized, one’s maxim
[of lying] transforms a mechanism for exclusively conveying the truth into mechanism for
conveying both the false and the true” (p. 23). From a societal standpoint, lying deteriorates and
“disrespects the collective interest of maintaining reliable channels of communication” (Shiffrin,
2014, pp. 23-24).22
Although this point displays how lying is antithetical to mutual communication, I would
like to further add that there are individual interests that are violated when a speaker engages in
the act of lying. Firstly, the liar wrongs their recipient or listener by not treating them as an
“equal partner” in their channel of communication (Shiffrin, 2014, p. 24). Clearly, this point
focuses on the interest of listeners in speech. This point is consistent with Shiffrin view that we
must treat each other as autonomous moral thinking agents. While this point suggests that
Shiffrin’s is neglecting the interests of the speaker, Shiffrin’s second point takes into

For Shiffrin (2014), possessing moral agency and “acquiring” our moral duties exert a lexical priority above other
things (p. 26). As a result, even if a lie were committed for a morally good end, it would risk “damaging one moral
priority to secure another” (p. 25).
22
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consideration the speaker is equally wronging themselves when they lie. As the second point
suggests, the liar wrongs themselves in that they isolate themselves from having a moral
relationship of “rational communication and justified beliefs” with the listener/recipient
(Shiffrin, 2014 p. 24). In this case, the liar is not only deteriorating a relationship between a
particular individual, but they are also isolating themselves from society by asserting a
proposition that damages the rational basis to trust the speaker. In reexamining the Boy Who
Cried Wolf case, the speaker’s constant lie led to the entire community isolating and losing
complete rational trust in the speaker. Given these various reasons, it is clear that lying can be
associated with a troubling type of wrongness that is present from multiple levels. Primarily,
these reasons showcase how lying entails several wrongs that are harmful and incompatible with
what makes speech so important to the thinker.
This incompatibility and harm that lying has to free speech suggests that a theoretical
case can be made that the legal regulation or condemnation of lies by the government may be
permissible and consistent with the values of free speech (Shiffrin, 2014, p.117). Now, it is
important to mention that the focus here is on insincere and deliberate lies. Shiffrin (2014) is
clear on excluding cases in which a speaker is sincerely communicating their belief, despite it
being completely false (p. 117). At the same, there will cases that will not be included since they
are either not deliberate (e.g., “spontaneous utterances”) or are justified in the context (Shiffrin,
2014, p.119). Indeed, none of these mentioned exceptions suggests that they undercut or devalue
the importance of speech in society. However, these exceptions do not suggest that “pure lies”,
which involve no intent or success of deception, are excluded. For Shiffrin (2014), there types of
lies are equally guilty of abusing the mechanisms of communication and reducing any reason to
rely on it (p. 116).
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With that said, I will now explain how the regulation of lies would remain consistent with
the value of free speech. Firstly, I would like to defend the position that there is a present and
particularized harm to free speech that follows when a lie is told. As mentioned before, a
speaker’s deliberate and insincere lie injures our “collective testimonial framework” in creating
doubt and reducing our reliance on others testimonial speech and expression. In this case, there is
a collective harm present that contaminates and poisons our only resource and tool to
communicate properly as thinkers, which is critical to “sustaining a functional moral and
political culture” (Shiffrin, 2014, p.136). Additionally, there is a particularized individual harm
inflicted towards the justified testimonial trust relationship between the speaker and their
listener(s). Without a doubt, any sustainable relationship that involves communication between
individuals is built on a form and exercise of trust. For Shiffrin, “such betrayals of that trust
would seem to wreak special damage on the relationship and its meaning” (Shiffrin, 2014, p.
136). While these harms may not be particularly observable or measured empirically, we can
make reasonable predictions of such causes and consequences. In facts, we often accept that
governments will take preemptive regulatory action based on reasonable predictions such as in
cases of noise reduction. Despite there being no empirical evidence that a particularized harm is
present, noise regulations are often legitimate actions to allow individuals to speak to others
“without distortion, strain, or intermittent interruption” and to maintain a reliable scheme of
communication. (Shiffrin, 2014, p. 138).
Secondly, I will elaborate on how the regulation of lies would not be based on content.
During my introduction of evaluative neutrality, I described how regulation by contentdiscrimination would directly conflict with freedom of speech and expression. While this fear
and concern is understandable, the regulation of lies, in its correct general form, is not based on
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content. In this case, the correct form would be to have regulation be based on the insincerity and
deliberate misrepresentations by speakers. As Shiffrin (2014) explains, regulation of lies would
be to “prohibit a speaker from presenting something she believes to be false as though she
believed it to be true” (p.126). In other words, the sincerity of the speaker when making a false
claim determines whether it ought to be regulated or not. For instance, reconsider the
conversation between Politician T and Citizen K. If Politician T was sincere in their false
assertion and truly believed it, then it shouldn’t be regulated. However, if the speaker was
insincere and knew that the lie was false, then that would merit some regulation by the
authorities (Shiffrin, 2014, pp.126-130). As such, what is being regulated isn’t the content of lie
itself, but rather the speaker’s mental stance and insincere motivations.23 Such a motivation or
stance can be guilty of misusing and distorting the important but fragile channels of
communication that we as thinkers rely on to both transmit and accept the mental contents of
others opinions and beliefs. Thus, we have good reason to believe that the regulation of
deliberate lies would not prompt content-discrimination or the problems that follow from it.
Thirdly, I would like to address the possible general concern that if governments were to
regulate lies, it would consequently hinder the value that false speech has to offer to
individuals.24 With this concern, I argue that this value of false speech does not apply directly to
the cases of deliberate lies and insincere misrepresentation of the truth. To explain, I agree that it
is important to allow individuals to express their thoughts and opinion, even if it’s false.
However, this value of false speech only applies when the individuals are sincere in the opinions

Of course, the wrongness of Politician T’s deliberate misrepresentation may be made more aware given contexts
such as if the lie was directed towards a larger audience of constituents or it involved an important policy decision.
Nevertheless, each situation in which Politician T deliberately misrepresented a belief falls under the authority of
regulation.
24
See Chapter 2 of On Liberty (Mill 1859)
23
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and thoughts that they believe. Again, deliberate misrepresentation of the truth not only devalues
testimonies and reliability but injures our ability to trust one another (Shiffrin, 2014, p.142-143).
Having insincere and deliberate false opinions and thoughts leads to distrust and cynicism of
both sides in an argument that make it difficult to be open-minded and willing to listen in “good
faith” to your opponent (Shiffrin, 2014, pp.143-144). This is especially concerning in situations
where the speaker has exclusive access to particular information, it is much more difficult to
reveal the truth if the public is limited in their knowledge and can’t confirm nor respond to the
truth of the lie (Shiffrin, 2014, p.140).25For these reasons, no concern should exist over the
regulation of deliberate insincere lies and the value of false speech.
Nonetheless, while Shiffrin’s (2014) argument is able perfectly to capture how the
regulation of lies would be consistent with free speech on theoretical level, she refuses to take
the argument further to directly endorse the legal regulation of lies (p.118). The pertinent point
for this refusal is that of the “pragmatic concerns” that surround such regulation and the open
possibility of government abuse by it. The regulation of lies leaves open the possibility that
criminal penalties will be abused by government authorities and police to selectively prosecute
and censor individuals (Shiffrin, 2014, p. 123). Even worse, such a possibility creates the threat
of reducing sincere speech under fear of prosecution. These concerns prevent her from making
the endorsement that governments should regulate insincere and deliberate lies on a general
level. Instead, Shiffrin suggest an alternative that in order to protect our rational basis for relying
on communication for mutual epistemic dependence, some “disclosure rules” are justifiably

25

While some may argue that insincere and deliberate lies hold an instrumental value to further good moral ends,
the same may be said about other regulable forms of deceit such as intentional defamation or fraud. In truth,
regardless of its benefits, insincere lies distinctively undermine the ability to rely on communication for fundamental
needs (Shiffrin,2014, p.153).
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necessary to differentiate insincere and sincere speech.26 That is to say that if someone wished to
speak insincerely, they would need to disclose this either openly through communication or some
other “well-understood mechanism of disclosure” (Shiffrin, 2014, p. 133).
However, Shiffrin leaves open the possibility that the legal regulation of condemnation
of lies can be made on a narrower level or specific domain. To elaborate, it can be argued that
any assessment regarding the legal regulation of lies should be determined on a case-by-case
basis since the threat of the pragmatic concerns will vary depending on several factors. As she
states, the “...scrutiny of legal regulation of lies should be far more focused on the specifics of
their design, namely whether the particular factual circumstances raise credible concerns about
government abuse” (Shiffrin, 2014, p. 118). That is to say that the design of the laws and its
application in regulating insincere lies will determine whether should be concerns over
government abuse or censorship (Shiffrin, 2014, p. 123). For this reason, we should not make
sweeping general claim to reject any legal regulation of lies. With this in mind, I will now argue
that the aforementioned predicament of fake news is such a case in which the harm of insincere
and deliberate misrepresentation is particularly problematic and the pragmatic concerns may be
minimal. I will now apply Shiffrin’s argument against lying to the conflict between fake news
and free speech and address the concerns that may linger over this specific domain.

Section 4) Fake News and Free Speech
Formerly, I have presented Shiffrin’s argument that the regulation of lying is theoretically
consistent with the value and traditions of free speech. As explained, free speech is integral to the

Shiffrin provides a non-exhaustive list of well-understood mechanisms include “deploying a sarcastic tone,
evidently exaggerating in ways that indicate parody or irony, publishing under the rubric of fiction, performing in a
play or other theatrical setting, or otherwise speaking in a context that is culturally understood not to all for somber
testimonial speech” (Shiffrin, 2014, p.134).
26
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free operation and development of our minds. As thinkers, speech and expression are the only
precise tools in which we can communicate, through testimony, our mental contents in order to
be successful moral agents and fulfill the various fundamental interests. For this reason, sincerity
is an essential quality for both speakers and listeners to have in order to rely on this mutual
epistemic dependence. Insincere and deliberate misrepresentation reduce, deteriorate, and
interfere with our rational basis for relying on these important channels of communication. I will
argue that fake news shares these same qualities of insincere lying that reduce our reliability and
trust on a developing but increasingly used channel of communication: The Internet/Social
Media. In previous sections, I have described that these types of harmful actions have
incentivized governments to intervene and create policies that call for the regulation of fake
news. In spite of the mentioned pragmatic concerns, I will apply Shiffrin’s argument here and
make the case that the regulation of fake news would be consistent with the values and traditions
of free speech.
In this section, I will apply Shiffrin’s framework of the argument to the case of fake
news. My objectives will be to, first, establish that social media and the internet are becoming
increasingly important channels of communication. Secondly, I will explain how my definition
of fake news is congruent with Shiffrin’s characterization of insincere and deliberate
misrepresentation. Third, I will argue that fake news is not only harmful to free speech, but that
the regulation of lying, in its correct form, is consistent with a right of free speech. While the
different forms of fake news may appear to be unusual forms of testimonies, I will give grounds
for how each follow a similar format as an assertion of lying. Later on, I will defend this position
by responding to the strong objections one may have to the regulation of fake news and address
the significant pragmatic concerns that have already been mentioned.
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To begin with, I will explain how social media and the internet are forming into central
channels of communication that we, as thinkers, rely on. While relatively new and more
unconventional than other forms of communication, the internet has become an increasingly used
form of communication that is being used by more and more people every day. According to a
recent study by the Pew Research Center, about two-thirds of American adults (68%) say that
they at least occasionally get news on social media (Smith & Anderson, 2018). Additionally, the
European Commission stated that, in 2018, European internet users that engage in various online
activities, 72% percent used it as a source for reading news online (Digital Economy and Society
Index (DESI), 2018). This recent evidence seems to be consistent with Shiffrin’s key idea that
communication is an important precise tool for us to epistemically receive information with one
another.
In fact, not only are social media and the internet becoming channels of communication
to receive news, but they’re increasingly growing into a reliable and trusted form of
communication to retrieve information such as news. Indeed, a substantial majority of surveyed
individuals feel that the internet had them better informed about national news (75%),
international news (74%), and pop culture (72%) (Purcell & Rainie,2016). The study goes on to
further say that 76% of online adults say access to the internet has made average Americans
better informed, while just 8% saying it has made them less well-informed (Purcell & Rainie,
2016). Unsurprisingly, this growing trust of social media and the internet to receive news
information is becoming a competing source against other well-established channels of
communication. As of August 2017, the percentage gap between those Americans who report
getting news online and those who reported getting their news on television was just a share only
7 percentage points lower. This percentage gap is striking since the gap in early 2016 between
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the two news platforms was a 19-point difference (more than twice as large) (Bialik & Matsa,
2017).
Already, we can see that social media and the internet are forming into one of the main
sources of communication in which people receive news. For instance, the American Federal
Election Commission found that only 18% of all Americans cited the internet as their leading
source of news about the 2004 Presidential elections (The Internet and Campaign, 2004).
However, the Pew Research Center found that by the 2016 American Election, that number rose
to 65% in which Americans stated an internet-based source as their leading source of information
for the election (Mitchell et al., 2016). On a more general level, the American Press Institute
2015 found that, among millennials, on 24 separate news and information topics probed,
Facebook was the No. 1 gateway to learn about 13 of those, and the second-most cited gateway
for seven others (“How Millennials Get News,” 2015). With all this evidence, the point is clear:
social media and the internet are an increasingly important channel of communication that are
being used by and relied upon by individual thinkers alike.
With that said, I would like to make the stronger case that not only is the internet
becoming more used and relied upon for news and information gathering, but also that the
internet is essentially growing to become one of the most significant channels of communication
that promotes the fundamental interests, goals, and capabilities of the thinker. To explain, the
thinker-based account established that as individuals, we have multiple fundamental interests
beyond the basic self-interests that derive from our intellectual capabilities as moral agents.
Now, the internet has made to it possible to freely realize these fundamental interests without
barricades or delays. If I as thinker am intellectually interested in apprehending the truth, the use
of an online search bar will quickly assist in this need. If I have an intellectual interest in

48

exercising my creative abilities, the internet has provided the greatest amount of freedom
possible to publish any work of art, opinion piece, or information to the public without
restrictions by third party sources. As social beings with a fundamental interest in living among
other social individuals, social media has enabled us to engage and communicate within seconds
of each other regardless of time/location. While I could go on further and list several nonexhaustive ways in which the internet has assisted, the point is clear: the internet and social
media have enabled us the most out of all communicative mechanisms to pursue the core
fundamental interest of thinkers. Undoubtedly, this is an important channel of communication
that utilizes speech and expression in its most genuine form.
However, these unrestricted features also emphasize the “fragile nature” of this particular
channel of communication. Given the fact that the internet is still relatively new as compared to
other channels, there is a lack of regulation or formal code of ethics to prevent any malevolent
agent to exploit it for their purposes. Any misuse or exploitation of this “fragile” mechanism of
communication would certainly limit the authenticity and accurate representation of people’s
mental content (Shiffrin, 2014, p. 25). In accordance with Shiffrin’s view (2014), I agree that the
internet and social media must be safeguarded “if we are to understand and cooperate with cone
another to achieve our mandatory moral ends [and fundamental interests]” (p. 118). Thus, when
it comes to the internet and social media, we must accept that it is a channel of communication
that is significantly important to the thinker to fulfill their interests but must also be safeguarded
against its fragile nature.
With the internet becoming an increasingly significant but fragile channel of
communication for the thinking agent, we must now consider whether fake news follows a
similar type of distinctive wrongness as lying. In earlier sections, I have demonstrated the
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growing presence of fake news in the age of the internet. However, I will now justify how fake
news fits with Shiffrin’s framework and characterization of a lie. As mentioned before, a lie can
be characterized as an “intentional assertion” of proposition P to B by individual A, who does
not believe P, and is aware that they do not believe P, but, nonetheless, intentionally presents P
in a manner that B is to take and treat P as an accurate representation of A’s belief. While this
framework of a false testimony suggests that lying is practiced only in direct conversations, I
maintain that fake news also follows a similar format. Regardless of the platform in which an
assertion is made, individuals will form beliefs based on another person’s presentation of the
truth. As an example, individuals that read news articles either in print or online will form a
belief that is held on the basis of the reporter’s testimony. With social media, when we circulate
headlines through our news feeds, we will be presented with several headlines that are based on
testimonies of others. In accordance with Shiffrin’s theory, social media and the internet have
positioned thinkers to have contact with multiple propositions at once that are based on
testimonies of individuals that we must assume are sincere representations of those individual’s
beliefs.
Unfortunately, fake news has empowered deliberate insincere false testimonies to coexist in this domain. As you recall, I defined fake news to be “Online publication of intentionally
or knowingly false statements of facts…” (Humprecht, 2018, p. 3). On an epistemological level,
these publications are “false assertions” that are intentionally presented as true by someone
online. However, these assertions carry unique elements that make them different from the
common forms of false testimony. Specifically, fake news can be broken down into two types of
testimonies: Primary False Testimony and Secondary False Testimony. Uncontroversially,
primary false testimonies follow the framework of a lie closely in that an individual (B) is
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initially presented a false belief asserted by individual (A). To illustrate, this type of false
testimony is where an individual (or bot) knowingly publishes a false article or statement that is
intentionally directed towards to an individual or larger audience online. In contrast, secondary
false testimonies differ in that the false assertion does not originate from individual A.27 Rather,
this “intentional assertion” of a false proposition to B by A originates from individual C as the
primary source. This is not uncommon in cases of fake news, since internet-made concepts such
as “retweeting “or “sharing” have allowed others to forward someone else’s content and publish
it as their own original testimony. An example of this form of testimony can be described when
an individual, knowing that it is false, deliberately shares towards a targeted listener audience
false data statistics that they found online in a context that assumes it represents their actual
belief. In either case, there is a speaker present that does not believe P, and is aware that they do
not believe P, but, nonetheless, intentionally presents it in a manner that is treated as an accurate
representation of the speaker’s belief.
While this second form may arguably seem unqualified to be associated with the
framework of a false assertion, the internet has epistemically changed the norms in which
listeners accept both types of assertions as original testimonies. In fact, epistemologist Regina
Rini (2017) argued that although Secondary False Testimony is a “bent form” of testimony, it
still shares similar aspects that play a role in the transmission of fake news. As Rini states, “The
epistemic relationship between testifier and testimony is ambiguous, as we haven’t yet settled on
a norm [on social media] whereby sharing entails assertion. Nevertheless, many of us treat social
media sharing as if it were ordinary testimony, at least until something goes wrong” (Rini, 2017).

While secondary false testimonies would seem to fit well with Shiffrin’s assertion, different epistemological
accounts of testimony would argue that they are unusual and are difficult to categorize as an assertion since the
connection between the speaker and their testimony is so detached. See; Rini (2017).
27
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To elaborate on this point, it is important to consider that fake news in all its forms violates
epistemic norms that are usually present in direct forms of false claims. In particular, there are
several cases of fake news in which individuals have ignored the rational norms of being
responsible thinking agents and suspended belief in order to believe absurd stories that normally
would not be accepted under normal circumstances. For instance, if someone were to
conversationally claim that several high-ranking officials of the political party were part of an
alleged child sex ring that involved a pizzeria restaurant, the claim would be less inclined to
rationally be believed. But, if the same claim were produced on the internet, individual’s
rationale to suspend belief on a ludicrous story would be reduced. Even after this false online
conspiracy was debunked publicly, The Economist and YouGov surveyed data that 46% Trump
Voters continued to believe the false conspiracy theory (Frankovic, 2016). As I’ve already
mentioned in previous sections, there are psychological factors present in these cases that assist
in dampening our intellectual capabilities to discern the truth. The evidence suggests that, while
fake news does not follow a similar format to a typical case of a false assertion, it does formulate
false beliefs just the same (perhaps even more successfully). Generally speaking, we have
established that in all cases of fake news there is (A) speaker present with an intention to
misrepresent their beliefs, and (B) there is an audience present willing to accept the false
assertions as original sincere testimonies.28 Therefore, we can generally accept that fake news, in
all its forms, satisfies the characterization of a lie.
By establishing this connection between fake news and lying, we can naturally assume
and apply the distinctiveness wrongness that follows just the same. To reemphasize, lying entails
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To clarify, Primary or Secondary False Testimonies would not include cases where the speaker sincerely
publishes, shares, or posts a false proposition, not knowing that’s its false. In these cases, the speakers are not trying
to misrepresent their beliefs to others.
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a type of wrongness that deteriorates the value of speech for both listening and speaking thinkers.
Similarly, this type of wrongness can be seen in the case of fake news. From the individual
standpoint, the relationship between the speaker and the audience and their interests is violated
when fake news is produced. The individuals that are being targeted by fake news are not being
treated as an equal partner in this relationship of communication, but rather they are manipulated
as a means to an end. Indeed, reconsider the fact that the Russian Internet Research Agency
targeted minority communities in an effort to create racial tension and conflict. This example not
only attempts to violate the equal partner relationship between the speaker and the listener, but
also has a motive to violate this same relationship among listeners by inserting mistrust and false
conflict. At the same time, those speakers who are deliberate and insincere in spreading fake
news equally wrong themselves by isolating themselves from having a relationship with the
listener built on trust, rational communication, and justified beliefs. In this case, the fake news
speakers are not only deteriorating a relationship between their targeted audience, but they are
also isolating themselves to ever trust such a speaker. Markedly, it is unlikely that instigators of
fake news such as Russia will be able to regain or achieve any level of trust with other target
sovereign nations after such actions.
The most compelling point that showcases the wrongness of fake news is that it severely
compromises our “rational basis” to support mutual dependence of testimonies or
communication from anyone on the internet. As thinkers, the internet has provided us with the
opportunity to speak and engage with multiple opinions and thoughts in an instant. However, this
communicative mutual relationship requires a “good faith” approach of sincerity that is built on
trust and reliance. Unfortunately, fake news has generated a problem that threatens that trust and
reliance on others testimonies in online communication. The insertion of fake news as part of our
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communication in social media and news feeds deteriorates and reduces the reliability of our
access to accurate representation of one’s belief. In effect, a pollution of fake news will
inevitably change the approach into to how we address each other in the internet. Specifically,
fake news will force us to take a “bad faith” approach in which we assume that any claim or
individual on the internet is subject to have an intent to deceive and manipulate. Such an
approach will be inconsistent and contradictory to the thinker-based goals and fundamental
interests that we have as human beings. Indeed, when we consider the wrong associated with
fake news to society, I concur with Shiffrin (2014) that these cases “disrespect the collective
interest of maintaining reliable channels of communication,” especially one as important as the
internet (pp. 23-24).
A point to emphasize in this argument is that lying, if universalized, transforms a
mechanism for exclusively conveying the truth into mechanism for conveying both the false and
the true. Although some may criticize this concept from Shiffrin of universality and the impact
that one lies can have on general level, it cannot be denied that social media and internet have
made it realistically possible for a single false news article to reach a substantial quantity of
people within the internet. This impact by fake news has already been felt by individuals. While
the use of social media and the internet has been at an increasing rate, a study by Statistica found
that, out of the 3,500 that surveyed, the share of North Americans that trust in social media has
declined to 34% whereas 65 % of respondents stated that they trusted traditional media to
provide general news and information (Edelman, 2018). Such evidence seems to align with the
view that fake news is changing the way we utilize one of the most important growing channels
of communication. It should come as no surprise then that critics of fake news will associate it
with adding further to the growing concepts of polarization and tribalism in our society today.
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For this reason, fake news and its dissemination seem to be in direct conflict with our intellectual
and moral interests as thinkers.
In earlier sections, I raised the question whether it would be permissible for governments
to regulate fake news on the internet. Critics and human rights organizations have mentioned
that, such regulation would violate and be inconsistent with freedom of speech. However, from
the thinker-based point of view, the regulation of fake news does not have to be inconsistent with
the value of free speech. In fact, government regulation of fake news would instead be consistent
and promote free speech. As mentioned previously, fake news produces several wrongs that are
harmful to the thinker. Mainly, fake news has injured the “collective testimonial framework” on
the internet and social media by creating doubt and reducing our reliance on others testimonial
speech and expression. This massive spread of disbelief has made it difficult for any individual
with a sincere opinion or thought to not be associated with a malicious purpose or false narrative,
even with credible sources. At the same time, the aim of fake news has not only inflicted harm
on the testimonial trust relationship between the speaker and their listener(s), but also aimed to
harm the relationship between listeners with each other as well. This intentional abuse by fake
news damages our reliability and rational trust to use these tools for speech and expression. As
intellectual thinking beings, the internet is a resource and tool that enhances speech and
expression to fulfill fundamental interests that are critical to the individual’s self-development
and to “sustaining a functional moral and political culture” (Shiffrin, 2014, p.136). From this
perspective, we can understand that fake news directly aims to injure the instrumental value that
is speech by (1) diminishing its reliability in a growing important channel of communication and
(2) reducing and deteriorating the relationships of trust we have with one another. Contrary to

55

what critics may say about government intervention, fake news in reality is inconsistent with the
value of free speech and expression.
With this point in mind, we can make the further case that government intervention and
regulation of fake news would not be inconsistent with free speech, but instead promote the
value of free speech. A point that is often misunderstood is that any right of free speech
supposedly only entails a prohibition of government to act. However, a right may also entail the
government to act in order to promote the value or meaning of such a right. Larry Alexander
argued that rights can be categorized as having positive and/or negative obligations (Alexander,
2005, pp.4-6). While negative obligations impose restrictions on actions that reduce liberties that
are protected under a human right, positive obligations entail individuals giving goods or
services to others. In this particular case, freedom of speech can also be a positive right since
governments would be required under such a right to promote or provide the means by which
individuals can speak or express themselves. Again, we often accept that governments will take
preemptive regulatory action to allow individuals to speak to others “without distortion, strain, or
intermittent interruption” and to maintain a reliable scheme of communication (e.g., noise
control in public forums) (Shiffrin, 2014, p.138). Therefore, we cannot always assume that free
speech entails prohibition of government regulation, but instead would entail the regulation of
certain kinds of speech.
I argue that the government regulation of fake news would fulfil this positive obligation
towards free speech. As realized, fake news has an intentional purpose to injure the value that
speech offers to the individual thinker and to society overall by diminishing the rational trust and
reliance in a significantly important channel of communication. In addition, such speech is
actively attempting to manipulate and exploit the testimonial relationships of trust and respect
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that we have for each other as speakers and listeners. Similar to other types of speech that is
regulated, fake news is distorting, interrupting, and putting a significant strain on maintaining a
reliable mechanism of communication to allow sincere speech and expression to be accepted. For
these reasons, we can accept that government regulation should act and intervene in the situation
of fake news to protect speech and promote it. A key point to remember is that, similar to the
lying case, regulation of fake news neither focuses on the truth value of the speech nor does it
discriminate on content since it is centered on the deliberate misrepresentation and sincerity of
the speaker. While this situation may still appear unusual, consider the situation of traditional
new media communication. If the newspapers or television news allowed for any columnist or
reporter to intentionally make up ridiculous or absolutely false stories to a large audience, it
would reduce the credibility and reliance on these channels.29 Unfortunately, the internet, in its
fragile unrestricted nature, lacks the same sort of internal regulation to prevent such
contamination. It is no surprise that despite the decrease in use, these old channels of
communication are still held with greater trust than the internet and social media. Thus, we can
conclude that the regulation of fake news does not have to be inconsistent/impermissible with the
value of free speech, but instead can be designed as a strong commitment to protect such a value.

Section 5) Substantive and Pragmatic Concerns Over the Regulation of Fake News
In taking this controversial position, there are admittedly some concerns that need to be
addressed regarding the regulation of fake news. These concerns can be categorized into two
types of concerns: substantive or pragmatic concerns. As I briefly touch upon before in my
discussion of Shiffrin’s argument for the regulation of lying, pragmatic concerns relate to the
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From a general point of view, this claim is true. However, it must be dodged that from an individual standpoint,
different traditional news media differ in trust depending on the person’s preferences.
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concerns that regulation would give the government too much power which would lead to
government abuse (Kendrick 2018). In contrast, substantive concerns focus on the concerns and
critiques over the theory and application itself. In this final section, I will defend this
controversial position against the key persuasive objections and concerns. Firstly, I will try to
address the substantive concerns over the regulation of fake news. While I have already
addressed some substantial objections in defending the thinker-based account of free speech and
the general regulation of lying, there are still two unaddressed substantive concerns saying the
regulation of fake news should be left to the individual to determine and not government
intervention. Furthermore, I will respond to the possible chilling effect criticism that is argued to
arise if regulation of fake news was permissible. Secondly, I will address the pragmatic concern
on whether the regulation of fake news will lead to governmental misuse or censorship of free
speech. Overall, I will argue that neither type of concern has any substantial ground to reject
government intervention and regulation of fake news.
The most prominent substantive concern that comes to mind when considering whether
the government regulation of fake news is justified on the thinker-based account relates to the
individual's responsibility to discern from sincere speech to deliberate insincere
misrepresentation. In this context, while this position accepts the harmful wrong that fake news
commits to the thinker, the burden of responsibility for filtering out fake news content should
only be left only to the individual and not the government. From this perspective, individuals
should hold epistemic responsibility when they decide to observe and inform themselves on the
internet. As thinkers, we must be able to utilize our intellectual capabilities to evaluate the source
and content of the information we receive and determine whether it is reliable. In fact, this
position would go on to further suggests that it would be ill-conceived to assume that an entire
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channel of communication is generally reliable and trusted. In reality, thinker’s individuals
should assess the reliability and trust of a source of content on a case by case basis. For instance,
an individual who is confronted with fake news on the internet should make an educated
assessment of its reliability to be trusted as a source of information based off several factors such
as the content, speaker, or rational. Indeed, these types of actions would align more with an
epistemic virtues character.
At the same time, the thinker-based account should not endorse the government or state
to take the responsibility for filtering out fake news, even if it has the pure intention to maintain
the internet as a reliable channel of communication. The problem with government action in
having this responsibility is that it would be highly intrusive to the individual in determining
what they consider to be reliable or trustworthy. Such type of action would be considered as
legal prohibition or regulation that abnormally shapes the conditions of free speech. Normally,
these conditions of free speech are shaped by individual efforts mentioned previously or through
some form of moral prohibition. To shape these condition under legal enforcement would be
intrusive to the ideal of maintaining an authentic form of communication. As Kendrick notes,
“The state’s involving itself in your sincerity across all the spheres of your life would seem to
stand in some tension with at least the “free part of the ideal of free and authentic
communication” (Kendrick, 2018). To emphasize, this form of intrusion by the government will
reshape the internet as an artificial channel of communication that is counterintuitive to
Shiffrin’s ideal of authenticity. Therefore, we should refrain from making permissible the
regulation of fake news, even under the thinker-based account, for its intrusiveness behavior to
the free operation and development of the mind.
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In response to this concern, I argue that the problem of fake news does require
government intervention in order for the internet to remain an authentic channel of
communication for both speakers and listeners. This objection raises the point that the conditions
of free speech for communication are usually self-regulated by individuals through some form of
epistemic evaluation or moral prohibition. However, I disagree with this point’s suggestion that
the internet is a normal form of communication. Instead, the internet is an unusual channel of
communication in which the traditional forms of self-regulation are not effective. As mentioned
before in previous sections, fake news has violated and escaped traditional forms of individual
epistemic evaluation for reasons that can be attributed to psychological factors. To reemphasize,
factors such as “confirmation bias” “cognitive dissonance,” the “backfire effect,” and the
“Dunning-Kruger Effect” have been found to negatively influence how we accept information on
the internet. Equally effective are political factors such partisan affiliation that either increases or
decreases the chances of accepting a testimony on the internet.30 Most importantly, there is a lack
of epistemic resources or time available for the average thinker to put in the effort to evaluate
every post or news article on the internet. With the plethora of constant news waves being put
forth, it is almost impossible for anyone to carefully evaluate each information for it reliability.
In regards to this impossibility, Regina Rini (2017) explained that:
“We take others’ words for it when we just don’t have the time to go out and investigate
claims for ourselves. Social media sharing is the same. There is so much information
available, and only so much time to conduct inquiries. In an epistemically non-ideal
world, given our temporal and cognitive limitations, it simply makes sense to trust others,
even when we antecedently know that this will sometimes lead us astray.”

In “Fake News and Partisan Epistemology,” Rini (2017) elaborates further on this idea by arguing that
partisanship is consistent with epistemic virtue.
30
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Indeed, the limitations imposed by the internet has positioned individuals to inadvertently rely on
and trust the testimonies of others. On an epistemic level, these factors highlight that the
individual is not responsible for failing to discern whether fake news is true or not.
If we cannot use individual means to differentiate the problem of fake news, can societal
or moral prohibition achieve it any further? Unfortunately, we cannot rely on moral norms or
institution to scrutinize deliberate insincere misrepresentations online. For one thing, these norms
or institutions found normally in situations of free speech are non-existent on the internet. In this
case, part of the problem is that these platforms on social media and the internet lack any form of
“infrastructure” to provide a norm of moral accountability. That is to say, that social media or the
internet had allowed and empowered individuals to be not be held informally accountable for any
of their actions. The result is that individuals tend to be less morally considerate of their actions
on the internet. As Rini (2017) argues in a solution to fake news, “better norms, facilitated by
wise institutions, are what will stop fake news exploiting gaps in otherwise reasonable norms of
communication and belief.” While I sympathize with Rini’s point, I am skeptical that these
norms are likely to occur or form naturally on their own. Nevertheless, as of now, there is no
form of protection to prevent individuals or groups from abusing this trust and misleading
multiple people on numerous occasions. Thus, we cannot rely on either self-individual evaluation
or informal forms of moral prohibition that usually accompany free speech to assist with dealing
with this problem.
Moreover, I disagree with the point that government regulation of fake news would be
characterized as “intrusive” and would conflict with a free and authentic channel of
communication. The problem with this point is that it frames the issue as violating the natural
authenticity of communication. However, I argue that this point exaggerates government
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intervention as reducing the authenticity of speech. While this argument may hold more weight
to it on a more general legal regulation of lies, it lacks that same effect on smaller cases such as
fake news. An important point keep in mind is that the regulation of fake news, if done properly,
is designed to promote sincerity by reducing acts of insincere deliberate misrepresentation of
information on a reliable source of communication. Such actions by the government should be
seen as maintaining the internet's authenticity rather than a curtail of it. In fact, government
restrictions and regulations are often placed in order to provide the best form of communication
accessible for everyone. For instance, the American Federal Communication Commission (FCC)
implements and enforces several laws intended to regulate multiple channels of communication
across all 50 states (“What We Do”, 2018). One type of action by the FCC is to make accessible
speech for Americans with disabilities such as deaf, hard of hearing, speech disabled and deafblind. While this form of action may be seen as intrusive in regulating speech, it not reducing the
authenticity of it but rather promoting its reliability to individuals who otherwise would not be
able to access this form of speech. Likewise, the regulation of fake news would similarly be
designed to increase accessibility and reliability. Therefore, this regulation of fake news should
not have associated as an intrusion on the authenticity of speech. More generally, the lack of
individual and moral prohibitions suggests that government intervention will be one of the only
resources to prevent the insincerity of fake news.
The second prominent substantive concern regarding the regulation of fake news pertains
to the “Chilling Effect.”31 As Kendrick describes, the chilling effect is a free speech principle
that states that speakers and listeners alike who face strict scrutiny or liability by government
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While the chilling effect is generally associated as a pragmatic concern, I agree with Kendrick that, from the
thinker-based perspective, because the chilling effect would leave a substantive impact on us engaging in a free and
authentic channel of communication. As Kendrick (2018) states, “This [effect] would seem to be a substantive harm
to the free speech values Shiffrin endorses.”
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regulation will remain silent under the uncertainty or fear of the accuracy in their information
and the fallibilities of the law that they will face (Kendrick, 2018). From an individual point of
view, it will be unclear as to when insincerity and sincerity is permissible or impermissible under
such a rule of law. Furthermore, governments are not perfect and will make mistakes on multiple
cases when implementing or applying laws to individuals. Even if the government were perfect
and made no mistakes, the concept and operation of this type of regulation would remain unclear
to individuals. In both cases, the regulation of fake news would encourage individuals to refrain
from speaking under fear of government action. The result is that valuable true sincere speech
will be “chilled” and damage the free and open channels of communication that are advocated by
Shiffrin. From the thinker-based account, this action will render the importance of speech as
significantly reduced in developing the fundamental interests. For this reason, the regulation of
fake news would instead present a harm to speech rather than a benefit to speech
In response to this second concern, I argue that the rationale for the chilling effect is
problematic and not sufficient enough reason to reject the regulation of fake news. Firstly, the
chilling effect is problematic in that it proclaims unpredictable and immeasurable consequences
to a type of regulation that has never been implemented before. In this case, the chilling effect is
asserting an ungrounded prediction of the consequences that will likely happen if the regulation
of fake news took place. With this objection, I am skeptical that such a regulation would
ultimately reduce the amount activity that occurs on the internet. But if we accepted that such a
consequence would occur, despite all the advancements in social sciences, it would be
impossible, to empirically determine if speech was reduced as a result of regulation. Even
Kendrick (2014) agrees that this rationale leads to an empirical uncertainty since it would be
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impossible to measure the impact of chilling on online speech that would occur as a result of
regulation (p. 1277).
Nevertheless, an important point to further consider is that from the thinker-based
account, future consequences would not negate the wrong that occurs when fake news is
asserted. The chilling effect focuses on unpredictable harms that may or may not occur in future
rather than the wrongful harm of fake news that empirically deteriorates our reliability in the
internet. Certainly, it is odd for an objection to focus on the harms to future potential speakers
rather than to the harms both listeners and speakers may now face (Kendrick, 2014, p.1277). To
put it another way, this position would argue that the protection of harmful speech by a
deliberate and insincere liar is justified under the rationale that it is important to prevent future
speakers from keeping silent. As Kendrick elegantly says, “This approach essentially says to
such speakers that You’re lucky there are so many nice speakers out there who actually deserve
protection. To keep from chilling them, we will tolerate you” (Kendrick, 2014, p. 1277). For this
reason, the chilling effect is not sufficient to justify the rejection of the regulation of fake news.
Moreover, I would like to emphasize that the distinctive wrongness of fake news creates
a type of reverse-chilling effect. In this case, I argue that a similar outcome to the chilling effect
could occur if no form of regulation was present to minimize the dissemination of fake news. To
elaborate, we already established in Shiffrin’s argument that fake news will ultimately
deteriorate a reliable form of communication that we use to fulfill our fundamental interests. If
everyone begins to spread false news and not be held accountable, then everyone will begin to
distrust each other and their sources of information no matter where the sources come from. In
other words, listeners will distrust and label everything as “fake news” without engaging with the
source or idea behind it. The result would be that speakers would find it pointless to combat this
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distrust and ultimately decide to remain silent and refrain from speaking. In effect, a chilling
effect would occur just the same. Under these circumstances, the substantive concern of the
chilling effect is rationally problematic and not sufficient to reject the regulation of fake news.
With this in mind, I will now focus my attention on addressing the pragmatic concern
regarding the regulation of fake news. Ultimately, the underlying core of any such pragmatic
concern will always be that such type of regulation would, as Shiffrin (2014) explains, “grant the
government an unthinkable vast amount of power, power that would, in turn, reignite valid
concerns about government abuse” (p. 130).32 As we already established, a general regulation of
lies would prove to be too strong of an enforcement to be considered permissible. Nevertheless,
it is possible that a narrower and specific form of regulation that is grounded in a specific domain
will avoid these worries over government abuse. To demonstrate a related law that has avoided
this problem, the Stolen Valor Act of 2013, which prohibited making false statements about
receiving military honors or award, is a form of narrow regulation that is generally accepted in
the U.S.33 Additionally, the FCC’s Fairness doctrine, was a type of U.S. policy that required
speakers in television and radio to present fair and balanced coverage of controversial issues of
interest to their communities, including by devoting equal airtime to opposing points of view.34
Primarily, one of the reasons this form of regulation did not raise any concern over government

32

To briefly explain the importance of addressing the pragmatic concerns in free speech, Joshua Cohen, in
“Freedom of Expression”, made two important points about facts of reality that need to be considered when address
government power. One of the first unfortunate facts of reality is the Fact of Bias, which claims that individuals will
generally tend to have confused and conflicting opinions about what they would prefer over with what they should
choose and what is best (Cohen, 1993). Indeed, this correlates with what we know about cognitive bias and fake
news, in which people on the internet will prefer stories that either validate their points or align with their
ideology/viewpoint. In addition, there is another unfortunate fact known as the Fact of Power, which states that
those with power will use whatever advantages are made available to them to silence/reduce anyone that disagrees
with them (Cohen, 1993). With these two unfortunate facts of reality in mind, there is a fear and worry that anyone
with the power of regulation will be able to decide what messages or content should be regulated based on their
personal values that a result in unfair reasons, opinions, and bias.
33
“Pulp. 113–12”; H.R. 258. (2013).
34
“FCC, 395 U.S. 367.” (1949).
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abuse of power for about 40 years was that the policy was limited in single domain of licensed
radio and television broadcasters. In view of these examples, I contend that the regulation of fake
news is a particular case that can be grounded in a narrow scope and limitations in order avoid of
government abuse of power.
Admittedly, while the regulation of fake news is consistent with the value of free speech,
the penultimate factor that will determine whether pragmatic concerns over government abuse of
power should be raised will be determined by the design and structure of the law itself. As
Shiffrin (2014) notes, “...scrutiny of legal regulation of lies should be far more focused on the
specifics of their design, namely whether the particular factual circumstances raise credible
concerns about government abuse” (p.118). Although I concur with Shiffrin’s reasoning, I will
maintain that the regulation of fake news would be able to address structural or implementation
issues that would raise concerns of government abuse. In order to further this point, I will
address two important structural issues that might raise pragmatic concerns over fake news.
One possible pragmatic issue with legal regulation of fake news would be that it would
be far too vague in its implementation and unable to provide a fair notice to individuals in what
is being regulated. In detail, speakers may be placed in a tough situation where it is difficult for
them to determine whether or not they are in a context to speak insincerely without being found
culpable for publishing fake news (Kendrick, 2018). Such outcomes may exist in cases of
institutional design flaws where the government has ill-defined fake news and does not provide a
thorough explanation as how one is held culpable. For example, Taiwan, Malaysia, and the
Philippines have been heavily criticized for vaguely defining fake news on a broad scope.
There’s no question that defining fake news as “Spreading rumors that is sufficient to undermine
peace and order via the internet,” will present problems of uncertainty and scope (“What Is Fake
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News and How Does It Affect Asia?” 2019).35 More specifically, the result would generate fear
that such legal prohibition of a vague concept would not provide a fair notice to citizens to avoid
persecution. From the thinker-based account, a lack of notice would lead to undermining the
internet as a free and authentic communication that is advocated by lack of respect toward
citizens (Kendrick, 2018). But even without thinking it from Shiffrin’s perspective, this design
flaw would present the pragmatic concern that such unrestricted government power would lead
to abuse.
In response to this worry, I argue that restrictions can be placed on laws that would
address these problems of fair notice and vagueness of fake news regulations. To address
vagueness, laws could be designed to establish a concrete and explicit definition of fake news
that mirrors the definition we’ve established. Having a precise definition would avoid have
uncertainty about the vague concepts involved. In fact, the more democratic government states
such as France and the U.S.36 have taken this explicit approach to define fake news and
associating with the electoral process and false sponsored content and commercial advertising. In
addition, these countries have been explicit to disinclude activities such as parody or satire.
Similarly, countries have also made strong efforts to address concerns over fair notice for
citizens. For instance, Germany’s The Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG) established a
stringent procedure in which those (providers or social media companies) accused of generating
fake news are notified of a complaint against them of a complaint37. Depending on the content,
those accused have either 24 hours to respond and delete the “illegal" content or 7 days after
checking the complaint. At the same time, France passed a fake news law that was explicit to its

“The Social Order Maintenance Act.” (2018).
See Honest Ads Act (2017); “Proposition relative à la lutte contre la manipulation de l’information,” (2018).
37
See “Network Enforcement Act (Netzdurchsetzunggesetz, NetzDG).” (2017).
35
36
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denizens that they would monitor and regulate online disinformation during election cycles only
(Fiorentino, 2018). These empirical examples enforce the point that pragmatic concerns of
government abuse need not arise if restrictions and limitations about the scope of power are
explicitly placed on fake news regulation. Indeed, it is no surprise then that, despite criticism
from advocates of free speech, citizens have generally approved of stringent but limited
regulations. Since its implementation in 2017, Germany’s regulation has been shown to have
overwhelming support with 87% of Germans said they approve of the policy (Holmes, 2018).
Thus, regulation on fake news, if designed properly, does not have to need to raise concerns over
government abuse.
On a final note, I would like to address the pragmatic issue on whether the type of
regulation matters in terms of justifiably regulating online speech? As you may recall, I
established that there are only two types of possible actions that a government can proceed when
regulating speech. More specifically, Type A regulation would focus on removing the speech
itself, while Type B regulation consists of the prosecution of the agent that generated and
published the fabricated false content. While the purpose this paper is not to establish a correct
method of law enforcement, I will briefly mention which seems to be more consistent with the
thinker-based value of free speech. In this case, both type A and type B regulations would seem
to be compatible with the value of free speech. With type A regulation, these forms of
government actions focus on the speech itself and removing the content from the platform.
Clearly, this type of action would be compatible with the thinker-based account since it focuses
on the distinctive wrongness of false assertion and how it reduces our reliability and trust.
Therefore, it seems to make sense to eliminate and remove the false assertion that entered this
channel of communication. At the same time, the thinker-based account focuses on the sincerity
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of the speaker and their deliberate intent to misrepresent their beliefs. Hence, type B regulation
would seem to be compatible as well, since it focuses on holding accountable the individual
agent(s) for their actions.
However, it is important to keep in mind that both types of regulations can be taken to
extreme measures that are not consistent with Shiffrin’s theory. Type A regulations could focus
on removing all and any future assertions made by the speaker. Likewise, Type B regulations
could consist of punitive damages that would entail going beyond simple fines such as
imprisonment or humiliating the agent with a “mark of shame” to prevent them from speaking
again. One possible way to explain why these extreme measures are wrong is because it
concludes that the agent is irredeemable or incorrigible from these acts of lying and as a result
must be barred from speaking again.38 However, this conclusion would contradict the thinkerbased account since it would reject the idea that anyone is far from being redeemed. In brief, one
of the fundamental interests for any thinker is to develop and improve upon their moral life by
forming and building moral mutual relationships with others individuals (Shiffrin, 2014, p. 51).
Isolating someone and preventing them from ever speaking again will negate the possibility of
redemption. As Shiffrin emphasizes:
38

A somewhat related pragmatic sub- issue that needs to addressed is whether governments should be limited in terms of how
they enforce regulation on different types of false testimony of fake news. As you may recall, I characterized the types of
possible testimonies on fake news as either Primary False Testimony and Secondary False Testimony. With primary false
testimonies, I do not see concern with governments using both A or B types of regulation to target direct false assertions made by
its originator. However, several pragmatic problems emerge over the use of Type B regulation for secondary false testimonies.
One particular problem is that while this is form of false testimony, I would argue that if it would become difficult and unclear as
to whether the government should hold accountable individual C’s deliberate false assertion when individual A is the one that
originally produced it. To illustrate this situation, imagine that liar (X1) knowingly and insincerely creates a false proposition P1
and publishes it online. Now, imagine that another liar (X2) comes into contact with P1 and decides to share it or repost it as their
own, knowing that it its false. Again, consider that another liar (X3) notices P1 and decides to act similarly to (X2). Now consider
that this is done 6 times. If the government discovered that P1 was being published online deceitfully and wanted to regulate it,
should they use Type B regulation to hold accountable liars X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, and X6 for regulation. Unfortunately, such
type of action would seem to generate too much concern for abuse given how many parties they could hold accountable for a
single lie. With the power of the internet, this worrisome is even greater since hundreds of people could be involved in spreading
the false proposition P1. For this reason, while there may exceptions to this rule such as when bots may be involved, I would
generally limit secondary false testimony of fake news to Type A regulation. It is important to recognize that government states
have attempted to avoid this issue altogether by holding accountable not individual’s sources, but the providers and social medias
companies themselves that have passed fake news.
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A peaceful avenue to social and moral reconciliation and redemption always be open to
even to those who have strayed, that even those who engage in wrong remain members of
the moral community…. and that the availability of this opportunity should not be
confined to those who have fully repented, in large part because achieving such
repentance and recognition is usually a process that requires assistance from others
(Shiffrin, 2014, pp.37-39).
Regardless of the liar’s attempt to degrade the internet as a reliable channel of
communication, the liar should not be shunned from communication as they can still contribute
to the conversation and further improve the mutual epistemic cooperation endorsed by Shiffrin.
Equally important, communication and social interaction are vital for the liar to pursue their
fundamental interests such as improving their moral character. If governments were to take
extreme measures from either type A or B regulation of fake news mentioned, then it would
eliminate the possibility of any individual to have redemption and isolate them from these
opportunities. For this reason, governments should refrain from taking extreme measures in
regulating fake news. In any case, there is no general answer to which type of regulation is
preferable over the other. In reality, Shiffrin’s key point that such “assessments” should be
determined on a case-by-case basis regarding the threat of extreme measures and pragmatic
concerns is critical here.
Ultimately, any concern that arises will depend on the circumstances and design of the
law. As Shiffrin (2014) points out, the design of the law, the “particular factual circumstances”
involved, and their application will fundamentally determine whether concerns about
government abuse should arise (p. 118). Nevertheless, this section of the paper has sought to
prove that there is no substantive concern to object to the regulation of fake news as a threat to
free speech under the thinker-based account. As has been argued, the regulation of fake news is
not only compatible with the value of free speech, but may also promote it. Moreover, while
pragmatic concerns of government regulation of fake news must always be taken seriously, I
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argue that these concerns can be (and have been) addressed with pragmatic solutions and
application. Under these circumstances, there is no reason to warrant a universal rejection of the
regulation of fake news.

Section 6) Conclusion
All things considered, the significant impact that fake news can have on the internet and
social media has promoted government states across the world to take regulatory action to
minimize the harm that fake news has on their targets. Many human rights and international
organizations have protested that such government regulatory response would violate the value
and traditions of free speech. As a result, a unique moral conflict can be realized regarding this
problem between free speech and fake news. In this inquiry, I argued that there is a compelling
account of free speech present that can resolve this issue. In this case, I presented Shiffrin’s
Thinker-based account of free speech, which emphasizes that humans are autonomous thinkers
with a unique capacity to be rational, emotional, moral, perceptual, and anything else that
pertains to the free operation and development of the mind. More specifically, there are core
fundamental interests that are connected to developing these capacities that promote our
individuality and further our moral relations with each other. Now, speech is an essential role in
this development and operation since it is one of the only tools in our disposal to express these
interests. For this reason, the thinker-based account would limit censorship of speech in order to
prevent obstructing the value that speech has to the thinker.
With this in mind, the thinker-based account also argues that lying presents a distinct and
harmful wrong to speech by discrediting our reliability on the trusted channels of
communication. In particular, the deliberate and insincere misrepresentation of one’s beliefs
forms a type of distinctive wrong that is found on multiple levels, both individual and societal.
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Similarly, fake news follows this type of characterization that harms the thinker by
compromising our “rational basis” to support mutual dependence of testimonies or
communication from anyone on the internet.in this manner. However, this harm is particularly
concerning considering that the internet and social media are gradually becoming not only
reliable forms of channels of communication, but can also be presented as the most important
channels of communication to the thinker. Moreover, the internet has empowered fake news to
amplify this wrong and render it more impactful. These reasons show that government regulation
of fake news would not be conflicting with the free speech values as suggested, but in fact may
be seen as way to promote these values. Indeed, there seems to be no substantive reason to object
that fake news regulation would harm free speech under the thinker-based account.
Unfortunately, there are pragmatic concerns of potential government abuse present that need to
be taken seriously when considering whether or not governments should have this power.
Nevertheless, I have shown that these concerns can be addressed with pragmatic solutions and,
thus do not entail a general rejection of the regulation of fake news. In fact, when we are
considering whether a particular government should introduce a law that regulates fake news, we
should steer away from using arguments about the value of free speech and, instead, focus more
on the relevant pragmatic arguments such as the design, structure, and implementation of such a
law.
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